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BREAKING UP THE LOCAL TELEPHONE
MONOPOLIES: THE LOCAL
COMPETITION PROVISIONS OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
At one time, the telephone industry was quite simple. A person
who needed to make a call simply picked up the phone and dialed,
without giving a second thought as to what company would be carrying
the call. After all, there was just "the phone company." In most in-
stances, this "phone company" was American Telephone & Telegraph
("AT&T").' AT&T handled practically all of the nation's long-distance
phone calls and, through its wholly-owned subsidiaries, a majority of
the nation's local calls as well. 2
In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act ("1934 Act"),
transferring telephone regulation from the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to the Federal Communications Commission su
ch The1934 Act granted the FCC the power to '"prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the
provisions of [the 1934 Act]." In section 2(b) of the 1934 Act, Con-
gress granted jurisdiction over interstate regulation to the FCC, while
reserving regulation of intrastate matters for the states, thus creating
a dual system of federal/state jurisdiction. 5 This dual jurisdiction sys-
tem has remained in effect to the present. 6
L See James A. White, Local Bell Companies Begin Push to Re-enter Long-Distance Market, WALL
Sr. J., Feb. 2, 1984 (page unavailable). In 1984, AT&T controlled 95% of the long-distance market.
See id.
2 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America at Counterstatement, Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC ("Iowa Ilf'), 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. July 18,
1997) (No. 96-3321). Until 1984, AT&T wholly owned 22 Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs"),
which were consolidated into seven Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RI30Cs") as part of
the 1982 Consent Decree. See infra note 11. In 1995, the RBOCs controlled BO% of the local
•telephone revenue. See Daniel Pearl, 'Baby Bells' See Better Chance of Gaining Access to New Markets
With GOP-Controlled Congress, WALL Sr. J., Jan. 20, 1995, at A14.
3 Communications Act of 1994, 47 U.S.CA. §§ 151-61, 201-14 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997).
4 Id. § 201(b).
5 See id. § 152. Section 2(h) was codified as 47 U.S.C. § 152(b), so the terms 1 2(h)" and
1 152(b)" have the same meaning and arc used interchangeably. For purposes of this Note, 47
U.S.C. § 152(6) will be referred to as "section 2(h)." Section 2(b) provides, in pertinent part,
"nothing in this chapter shall he construed to apply or to give the [FCC] jurisdiction with respect
to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection
with intrastate communications service . . ." Id. § 152(b).
6 See id. § 152.
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Although this dual system of jurisdiction remains in effect, soci-
ety's understanding of the telephone industry has changed.? Until
recently, society had viewed it as a "natural monopoly"—an industry
whose economies of scale represent a barrier to competition and result
in a single provider of a good or service.8 Because telephone carriers
were monopolists, the federal and state governMents heavily regulated
the carriers, prescribing the rates, terms and conditions of the tele-
phone service provided by the monopolistic carriers in return for
granting an exclusive franchise and allowing the carriers to earn a fair
rate of return on their investments. 9 As technology advanced, the
assumptions underlying the natural monopoly theory began to crum-
ble, and new opportunities for competition arose.° In 1982, the federal
government and AT&T entered into a consent decree in which AT&T
divested itself of its Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs" ), I1
Under the terms of the consent decree, the newly liberated RBOCs,
which held exclusive franchises to provide local telephone service,
were prohibited from entering the long-distance market, while AT&T
was prohibited from entering local markets." Thus, a new regulatory
scheme developed in which the long-distance market was open to
competition, while local markets continued to operate under natural
monopoly regulations.' 3 .
Since the 1982 consent decree opened up the long-distance tele-
phone market, competition has been fierce as new competitors en-
7 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 2-3, Iowa III, (No. 96-3321).
" See id: The McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Modern Economics defines "natural monopoly" as "a
natural condition that makes the optimum size of the firm so large in relation to the market that
there is room for only one firm." THE McGRaw-HILL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 394
(2d ed. 1973). In a natural monopoly market, the most efficient firm is one of a size that is
sufficient to serve the entire market; its average cost is still decreasing, which makes any compe-
tition against that provider impracticable. See CitaRlis H. KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION To U.S.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 140 (1994).
9 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 2-3, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
1 ° See id. at 3.
11 See United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem., 460
U.S. 1001 (1983). In this case, also referred to as the Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ"),
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia approved the consent decree between
AT&T and the United States justice Department, providing for the separation of AT&T's wholly-
owned local exchange carrier ("LEG") subsidiaries, which provided local telephone service, from
the rest of AT&T, which continued to provide long-distance service. See id. at 226-28. These 22
former subsidiaries consolidated into seven RBOCs, namely Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth,
NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, SBC Communications and US West. See KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 50-51.
At the time of this writing, two mergers had occurred: Pacific Telesis with SBC Communications
and Bell Atlantic with NYNEX, reducing the number of RBOCs to five.
12 See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 226-28.
19 See id.
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tered the market; long-distance rates have fallen sixty percent." As this
new marketplace evolved, Congress perceived that the 1934 Act was no
longer geared to address it effectively. 15 In response, Congress enacted
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ('"TCA") . 16 The TCA addresses a
wide range of communications-related markets, such as local tele-
phone, long-distance telephone, broadcast television, cable television
and the internet.' 7 The local telephone competition provisions of the
TCA established a few principal goals.' 8 Among these were opening the
local markets to competition and promoting increased competition in
markets that were already open to competition. 19 Congress chose to
implement the TCA by amending and supplementing the 1934 Act,
such that its provisions are still in effect unless amended or repealed
by specific provisions of the TCA. 2°
As required by section 251(d) (1) of the TCA, the FCC on August
8, 1996, issued regulations implementing the local competition provi-
sions of the TCA.2 ' Shortly thereafter, multiple telephone carriers and
state regulatory commissions sued in an effort to enjoin the regulations
from taking effect, claiming that the regulations were beyond the scope
of the FCC's authority and were contrary to the provisions of the TCA. 22
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, after con-
solidating these cases, granted injunctions on September 27 and Oc-
tober 15, 1996, the latter to be effective until a decision could be made
on the merits after oral arguments, which were made on January 17,
1997. 25 On July 18, 1997, the Eighth Circuit issued its decision on the
merits of the case and vacated a portion of the FCC regulations,
Seejohn J. Keller, Telecommunications (A Special Report): Making the Call, WAL.t. Sr. j., Sept.
16, 1996, at R14.
13 See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.CA.N.
(110 Stat.) 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
1 ° See id.
17 See id.
18 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, No. 96-98 (released Aug. 8, 1996) ("First Report & Order") [hereinafter FRO].
19 See id, at n.3.
20 See supra note 15.
21 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d) (1) (West Supp. 1997); FRO, supra note 18. Section 251 (d) (1)
states that "[w]ithin 6 months after the date of enactment of the [TCA] , the [FCC] shall complete
all actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of this section." 47
U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(1).
22 See lows Utils. Bd. v. FCC ("Iowa IF), 109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir, Oct. 15, 1996) (order granting
preliminary injunction).
23 See id.; Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC ("Iowa I"), 96 F.3d 1116 (8th Cir. Sept. 27, 1996) (per curiam)
(order granting temporary restraining order).
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holding, inter alia, that the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing its
pricing regulations. 24
This Note focuses on one aspect of the TCA—the opening of local
telephone markets to competition. More specifically, this Note will
analyze the proposed FCC regulations regarding pricing of access to
the existing networks by new entrants. Section I will describe the
specific relevant provisions of the- TCA, describe the related regulations
promulgated by the FCC, provide relevant background material and
give a brief overview of the first federal court case to address these
pricing regulations." Section II will describe the competing arguments
involved in the dispute, and explain in greater detail the court's deci-
sions granting a stay against enforcement of the regulations and then
vacating a portion of the regulations." Section III will analyze the
competing arguments and the court's decisions and will propose a
resolution. 27
I. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, THE FCC PRICING
REGULATIONS AND THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
A. Specifics of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
The relevant portions of the TCA are section 251 ("Intercon-
nection"), section 252 ("Procedures for Negotiation, Arbitration, and
Approval of Agreements") and section 253 ("Removal of Barriers to
En try"). 28 Section 251 addresses the duties and obligations of telecom-
munications service providers, such as providing competitors with ac-
cess to existing networks at reasonable rates, negotiating in good faith
with competitors and reselling existing retail product offerings to com-
petitors at wholesale prices. 29 Section 252 explains the procedures to
be followed by companies and state regulators in order to effectively
grant competitors access to local phone markets." Section 253 ensures
that state and local governments will not enforce any unreasonable
barriers to entry into the local telephone markets."
24 See Iowa III, No. 96-3321,1997 WL 403401, at *9 (Sth Cir, July 18, 1997).
25 See infra notes 28-152 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 153-296 and accompanying text.
27 Ste infra notes 297-403 and accompanying text.
28 See 47 U.S.CA. §§ 251-53 (West Supp. 1997).
"See a § 251.
30 See O.§ 252.
31 See id. § 253.
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1. Section 251
At its most basic level, a local telephone network consists of a "local
loop," which connects a telephone to a switch that in turn routes calls
from one telephone to another." The loop and the switch, along with
other similar components of a telephone network, are referred to as
"network elements."" In order to complete a call, a local exchange
carrier ("LEC") must route the call through each of the necessary
network elements. 34 The technical problems of competition within a
local telephone market involve allowing competitors to access the
existing networks." Because local telephone carriers are monopolies,
each carrier owns the network that connects all of its customers." A
competitor who cannot access this network cannot compete against the
incumbent carrier because the competitor's customers will be unable
to place calls to those consumers who are connected to the existing
network.37 To allow potential competitors to enter local telephone
markets, Congress created three rights.' The first, the right to inter-
connection, allows a competitor to access the existing network." The
second right, unbundled access, allows a competitor to use only those
network elements which it requires without being forced to use un-
wanted elements. 1° The third, resale, allows a competitor to purchase
32 See KENNEDY, supra 1101C 8, at 3.
53 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(45) (West Supp. 1997), The TCA defines "network element" as:
a facility or equipment used in the provision of a telecommunications service. Such
term also includes features, functions, and capabilities that arc provided by means
of such facility or equipment, including subscriber numbers, databases, signaling
systems, and information sufficient for billing and collection or used in the trans-
mission, routing, or other provision of a telecommunications service.
Id.
54 See KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 3.
55 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America at Counterstatement, Iowa III, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997) (14o. 96-3321).
36 See id.
37 See id.
as See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West Supp. 1997).
59 See id. § 251(c) (2). This section provides that an incumbent LEC has the duty to provide:
interconnection with the [LEC's] network—(A) for the transmission and routing
of telephone ... service .	 ; (B) at any technically feasible point within the
carrier's network; (C) that is at least equal in quality to that provided ... to itself;
and (D) on rates, terms, and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of
this section and section 252.
Id.
4° See id. § 251(c) (3). This section provides that an incumbent LEC has the duty to provide:
to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommuni-
cations service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled
156	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:151
the incumbent LEC's existing retail offerings at a wholesale rate, which
the competitor may then resell to customers."
Congress imposed certain duties upon existing telecommunica-
tions carriers because these carriers could not be expected to agree
voluntarily to help any competitors access their networks. 42 Section 251
imposes upon both'existing and new carriers the duty to "interconnect
directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other tele-
communications carriers . . . . "43 In addition to this general obligation,
all local exchange carriers have other duties. 44
Incumbent LECs have additional duties. 45 Among these are the
duties to negotiate with potential competitors in good faith concerning
the rates, terms and conditions of agreements to fulfill the duties the
TCA imposes, and to provide quality interconnection with its network
to any competitor at any feasible point on that network on rates, terms
and conditions outlined in the agreement and consistent with the
requirements of the TCA. 45 In addition, incumbent LECs must provide
unbundled access, which entails providing the individual elements of
telecommunications service, and offer their own retail products for
resale to a competitor at a wholesale rate. 47
basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252. An incumbent
[LEC] shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows
requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommu-
nications service.
Id.
41 See id. § 251(c) (4). This section provides that an incumbent LEC has the duty:
(A) to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications service that the
carrier provides at retail to subscribers who arc not telecommunications carriers;
and (B) not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable or discriminatory condi-
tions or limitations on, the resale of such telecommunications service, except that
a State commission may, consistent with regulations prescribed by the [FCC] under
this section, prohibit a reseller that obtains at wholesale rates a telecommunications
service that is available at retail only to a category of subscribers from offering such
service to a different category of subscribers.
Id.
42 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America at Counterstatement, Iowa III, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997) (No. 96-3321).
45 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(a) (1).
44
 See id. § 251(b). Among these duties are the following: not to prohibit nor impose unrea-
sonable or discriminatory conditions on the resale of its telecommunications services; to provide
number portability, which allows a consumer to keep his or her phone number even after
changing carriers; and to establish reciprocal compensation agreements with competitors for the
transport of telecommunications. See id.
45 See id. § 251(c).
46 See id.
47 See id. §§ 251(c) (3), (c) (4). The purpose of 47 U.S.C. § 251 is to lay the groundwork for
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2. Section 252
Merely requiring incumbent LECs to negotiate with competitors
will not by itself result in these parties actually reaching an agreement."
In order to put some teeth into the duties outlined in section 251,
Congress outlined procedures for these negotiations and, should the
negotiations fail, for arbitration or mediation of the negotiations." The
procedures describe the steps each party may take during the negotia-
tion or arbitration, including what a voluntary agreement must specify,
when either party can request mediation by the state regulatory com-
mission, when each party can request arbitration by the state regulatory
commission and the standards to be followed in this arbitration. 5° This
section also requires that any agreement, whether reached by voluntary
negotiation or by arbitration, be approved by the state commission and
sets forth the reasons a state may reject an agreement. 5' Section 252(i)
competition within the local phone markets. See id. § 251. Because existing LECs have monopoly
power within their markets, they have no incentive to help competitors who have little, if anything,
to offer them, and who are attempting to expand market share at the expense of the existing
LECs. See KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 140-43. The method Congress chose to allow competitors
to enter local markets, therefore, was to impose a duty upon the incumbent LECs to allow access
to existing networks. See 47 U,S.C.A. §§ 251(a), (b), (c). Congress designed the specific duties
imposed upon LECs to ensure that competitors can compete in the local markets by requiring
that LECs negotiate in good faith, connect competitors to their networks in a quality manner and
at a reasonable and just price, offer existing retail products for resale by competitors and allow
access to the individual elements of telecommunications so that competitors are not forced to
purchase unwanted elements. See id. § 251. In addition to imposing duties upon LECs, 47 U.S.C.
§ 251 addresses other areas of teleconununications service. See id. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d) addresses
the implementation of the provisions of the TCA. See id. § 251(d) (3). This section states:
[in] prescribing and enforcing regulations to implement the requirements of this
section, the [FCC] shall not preclude the enforcement of any regulation, order, or
policy of a state commission that—(A) establishes access and interconnection obli-
gations of [LECs]; (13) is consistent with the requirements of this section; and (C)
does not substantially prevent implementation of the requirements of this section
and the purposes of this part.
Id. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) outlines jurisdiction and cost issues for numbering administration. See id.
§ 251(e) ("[t]he [FCC] shall have exclusive jurisdiction over those portions of the North Ameri-
can Numbering Plan that pertain to the United States. Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude
the [FCC] from delegating to state commissions or other entities all or any portion of such
jurisdiction"). 47 U.S.C. § 251(f) addresses exemptions, suspensions and modifications of the
duties imposed upon LECs. See id. § 251(f). 47 U.S.C. § 251(h) provides for the definition of
"incumbent LEC" for the purposes of the section. See id. § 251(h).
49 See id. § 252.
49 See id.
"See id. Section 252(c) (1) states "[i]n resolving by arbitration . . . any open issues and
imposing conditions upon the parties to the agreement, a state commission shall—(l) ensure
that such resolution and conditions meet the requirements of section 251, including the regula-
tions prescribed by the [FCC] pursuant to section 251 . . . ." M. § 252(c) (1).
al See id. § 252(e).
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requires that each incumbent LEC provide any service on the same
terms and conditions to any requesting competitor. 52
Section 252(d) outlines the methods state commissions shoitld use
in setting prices for interconnection and network elements, transport
and termination of traffic and resale of retail offerings." The statute
requires that the prices for interconnection and network elements be
based on the cost of providing the interconnection or network ele-
ment." Another portion of this subsection states that the wholesale rate
for retail offerings shall be the incumbent LEC's retail rate, less any
marketing, billing, collection and other costs that will be avoided. 55 The
statute also addresses the availability of so-called "bill-and-keep" ar-
rangements."
3. Section 253
Because individual states regulate local telephone service, Con-
gress intended to ensure that states could not erect barriers to entry
to any local market. 51 Therefore, in section 253, Congress included a
provision that no state or local regulation shall have the effect of
prohibiting entry of a competitor into a local phone market." Con-
gress did, however, provide exceptions for ensuring quality service,
protecting the rights of consumers and protecting the public safety and
32 See 47 U.S.CA. § 252(i). This section states in full, "Availability to other telecommunications
carriers.—A[n] [LEC] shall make available any interconnection, service, or network element
provided under an agreement approved under this section to which it is a party to any other
requesting telecommunications carrier upon the same terms and conditions as those provided
in the agreement." Id. This is the statutory basis for 47 C.F.R. § 51.809, the "pick-and-choose"
rule. See id.; see also 47 C.F.R. § 51.809 (1996).
55 See 47 U.S.CA. § 252(d).
54 See id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i). This subsection provides that rates for interconnection and
network elements "shall be . . . based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-re-
turn or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the interconnection or network element . . ."
Id.
55 See id. § 252(d) (3). This subsection provides, in full:
(3) Wholesale prices for telecommunications services.—For the purposes of section
251 (c)(4), a State commission shall determine wholesale rates on the basis of retail
rates charged to subscribers for the telecommunications service requested, exclud-
ing the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing, collection and other
costs that will be avoided by the [LEC].
Id.
56 See id. § 252(d) (2) (B). The subsection provides, in pertinent part, "(B) Rules of construe-
tion.—This paragraph [dealing with the state commission's responsibility to approve reciprocal
compensation agreements] shall not be construed—(i) to preclude arrangements that afford the
mutual recovery of costs through the offsetting or reciprocal obligations, including arrangements
that waive mutual recovery (such as bill-and-keep arrangements) . . . ." Id. For a description of
a "bill-and-keep" arrangement, sec infra note 102.
57 See id. § 253 (West Supp. 1997).
55 See id. § 253(a).
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welfare." Section 253 also provides that if the FCC determines that a
state or local regulation does prohibit entry of a competitor into a local
market, then the FCC shall preempt enforcement of that regulation. 60
B. Specifics of the FCC's Pricing Regulations
In section 251(d) (1) of the TCA, Congress authorized the FCC to
promulgate regulations in order to implement the provisions of the
TCA and required that the FCC do so within six months from the date
the bill was signed into law."' On August 8, 1996, the FCC issued its
First Report and Order ("FRO"), which contained the regulations (and
explanations of the regulations) for implementing the local competi-
tion provisions of the TCA." The relevant regulations are divided into
four separate parts—pricing of elements, pricing of resale of retail
offerings, reciprocal compensation for transport and termination of
local telecommunications traffic and the "pick-and-choose" rule.°
1. Pricing of Elements
The general pricing standard for network elements is a choice
between two alternatives."' The first alternative a state commission may
choose is a forward-looking economic cost-based pricing methodology
set forth in the regulations. 65 The second choice is a pricing method-
ology consistent with FCC-mandated proxy rates set forth in the regu-
lations.""
a. Forward-Looking Economic Cost
Section 51.505 of the FRO sets forth in detail the forward-looking
economic cost-pricing methodology. 17 The forward-looking economic
59 See id. § 253(b).
60 See id. § 253(d). This section reads, in full:
(d) Preemption—If, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, the [FCC]
determines that a State or local government has permitted or imposed any statute,
regulation, or legal requirement that violates subsection (a) or (b), the [FCC] shall
preempt the enforcement of such statute, regulation, or legal requirement to the
extent necessary to correct such violation or inconsistency.
Id.
6 t See id. § 251(d)(1).
62 See FRO, supra note 18. The regulations contained therein were published in Chapter 47
of the Code of Federal Regulations.
63 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501-15, .601-17, .701-17, .809 (1996).
64 See id. § 51.503.
65 See id. § 51.505(h)(1).
66 See id. § 51.503(b) (2).
67 See id. § 51.505.
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cost of an element is the sum of the total element long-run incremental
cost ("TELRIC") of the element, plus a reasonable allocation of for-
ward-looking common costs. 68 This total cost is then divided by the
reasonable projection of the number of units to be used by the incum-
bent LEC and the competitor to arrive at a per-unit cost. 68
TELRIC is a method of calculating costs based solely on forward-
looking costs, without regard to prior "embedded" costs." It is the sum
of all the long-run forward-looking costs that are directly attributable
to that element." The regulations contain assumptions to be used in
calculating the cost. 72 The most important assumption is that the in-
cumbent LEC is using the most efficient telecommunications technol-
ogy 'currently available and the lowest cost network configuration,
whether or not the LEC is actually using them." The second part of the
equation, a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs, is
designed to capture those costs that cannot be directly attributed to a
specific element but are incurred by the LEC. 74 This calculation is
based upon the forward-looking common costs incurred by a hypo-
thetical LEC that is efficient and produces nothing but the specific
network element." The regulations list specific factors that may not be
considered when calculating the forward-looking costs of an element."
They are embedded costs (costs incurred in the past by the LEC that
are on the LEC's books); retail costs (costs such as marketing, billing
and collection); opportunity costs (revenues that the LEC would have
received in the absence of the new competitor); and revenues to
subsidize other services."
68 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(a).
69 See id. § 51.511.
"See Id. § 51.505(b), (c).
71 See id. § 51.505 (b ).
"See id. § 51.505(b)(1).
78 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b) (1).
74 See id. § 51.505(c).
75 See id. § 51.505(c) (2) (A).
76 See id. § 51.505(d).
77 See id. For illustrative purposes, assume an existing LEC named Carrier A. Potential
competitor B has asked A to negotiate a deal to provide B with one of the elements in the network,
but the two sides cannot work out an agreement and the matter is submitted to the state
commission for arbitration. Under the FCC regulations, the state commission must calculate a
rate based upon the forward-looking costs of providing that element. See id. § 51.505. Thus, in
this procedure, unlike in traditional rate-setting procedures, the state commission cannot look at
how much A has spent in the past building its network, nor can it look at A's current incremental
cost of providing the element to B, nor can it look at the long-run future incremental cost of
providing that element to B. See id. Rather, the state commission can look only at two costs: first,
the long-run direct costs of providing that element to B, assuming that A has and will continue
to have the most efficient telecommunications technology and the lowest cost network configu-
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b. FCC Proxy Rates
In the alternative, state commissions may choose a rate for each
network element that is consistent with proxy rates set forth in the
regulations:18 The FCC realized that with the short time-span that
Congress allotted to the FCC to promulgate the regulations and for
state commissions to set rates based on those regulations, many states
would not have time to review the forward-looking cost analyses out-
lined above. 79 In order to alleviate this situation, the FCC calculated
price ranges for each network element." If a state commission deter-
mines that it does not have enough time to review a TELRIC analysis
fully, it has the option of setting a price for each element based on the
FCC-mandated price range.8 ' That price is to be effective only`until the
state commission is able to conduct a TELRIC analysis and set a price
based thereon.82 The proxy rates are different for each network ele-
ment, and are either price ceilings, under which the state commission
must set its rate, or price ranges, which provide for both a ceiling and
a floor."
2. Pricing of Resale of Retail Offerings
The regulations for resale of retail offerings are structured simi-
larly to the regulations for pricing of network elements. 84 State com-
missions have a choice between either rates based on a cost method-
ology outlined in the regulations or rates that are consistent with
FCC-mandated interim wholesale rates. 85 If the state chooses the latter
because it does not have the time to review a full cost analysis, these .
interim wholesale rates are to be in effect only until the state commis-
ration, whether or not this is true, and second, a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common
costs—costs that are incurred by the LEC but cannot be attributed to one specific network
element—assuming that A's costs arc equal to those of a hypothetical efficient producer of that
network element, whether or not this is true. See id. The total of these two costs is the rate that the
state commission must set to be charged by A to B for B's use of A's network element. See id,
"See 47 C.F.R. § 51.503.
79 See FRO, supra note 18, at 11.767.
88 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.513.
141 See id.
" See id. § 51.513(a)(1).
85 See id. § 51.513: For example, for local loops, the FCC has set forth a price ceiling on a
state-by-state basis. See id. § 51.513(c) (1). The prices vary from a low of $9.83 in Massachusetts
to 525.36 in North Dakota. See id. For local switching, the price range is no less than 0.2 cents
per minute and no more than 0.4 cents per minute, unless a state commission has previously set
a rate less than 0.5 cents per minute. See id. § 51.513(c)(2). For tandem switching, the rate is no
greater than 0.15 cents per minute. See id. § 51.513(c) (5).
84 See id. §§ 51.609, .611.
55 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.609, .611.
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sion can conduct a full cost analysis based on the methodology out
 in the regulations.88
The method for determining the permanent wholesale rate to be
charged by incumbent LECs is described in section 51.609 of the
FRO. 87 This method entails calculating the current retail price, less any
avoided retail costs. 88 The avoided retail costs consist of "those costs
that reasonably can be avoided when an incumbent LEC provides a
telecommunications service for resale at wholesale rates to a requesting
carrier."88 The regulations list the costs that are included as avoidable,
such as advertising, sales, customer service and product management,
and those costs that are not considered avoidable, such as plant ex-
penses." . The regulations provide an opportunity for both sides to
prove that certain expenses should or should not be deemed avoidable
expenses notwithstanding their inclusion or exclusion in the regula-
tions' calculations.8 '
Alternatively, state commissions may choose interim wholesale
rates if the commission cannot calculate, based on the information
available to it, a rate consistent with the above pricing methodology. 82
If the state commission chooses this option it must, within a reasonable
time, establish wholesale rates on the basis of the avoided cost pricing
methodology.° The state commission may establish an interim whole-
sale rate that is at least seventeen percent and no more than twenty-five
percent below the existing retail rate." The commission must explain
its basis for choosing the particular rate, and must apply that rate for
all retail offerings."
3. Reciprocal Compensation for Transport and Termination of
Local Telecommunications Traffic
The regulations for reciprocal compensation for transport and
termination of local telecommunications traffic are also similarly struc-
tured to the regulations for the pricing of network elements and the
resale of retail offerings." Again, state commissions have a choice
86 See id. § 51.611 (c).
87 See id. § 51.609.
88
 See id.
89 Id. § 51.609(b).
98 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.609(c).
91 See id. § 51.609(d).
92 See id. § 51.611(a).
95 See id. § 51.611(c).
91 See id. § 51,611(b).
95 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.611(b).
96 See id. § 51.705.
	 •
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between either a cost methodology outlined in the regulations—in this
instance there are two methodologies—or rates that are consistent with
FCC-mandated interim proxy rates. 97 If the state chooses the latter
because it does not have the time' to conduct a full cost analysis, these
interim proxy rates are to be in effect on a temporary basis until the
state commission can conduct a full cost analysis based on the meth-
odology outlined in the regulations. 98
The rates for transportation and termination of local telecommu-
nications traffic are set by the state commission on one of three bases:
the forward-looking costs of providing the service; FCC default proxy
rates; or so-called "bill-and-keep" arrangements." Under the first alter-
native, states are to set the rates using the TELRIC pricing methodol-
ogy outlined above.'" In the interim period while the state is conduct-
ing the TELRIC cost study, the state may use the FCC proxy rates as
long as it explains its basis for selecting that particular rate within the
FCC's proxy range. 101 Under the third alternative, in which neither
LEC charges the other for use of its network, the FCC's regulations
allow the state commission to impose a bill-and-keep arrangement if it
determines that the amount of telecommunications traffic going be-
tween the respective networks is roughly balanced.'"
4. The "Pick-and-Choose" Rule
Section 252(i) requires that each incumbent LEC provide any
telecommunications service that it already provides under an existing
agreement with another carrier to any requesting competitor on the
same terms and conditions as that of the existing agreement.'" In
promulgating its regulations, the FCC provided that the incumbent
LEG must provide any service on "the same rates, terms, and conditions
as provided in the agreement." 144 The incumbent LEC can avoid this
97 See id.
"See id. § 51.707(a)(1).
99 See id. § 51.705.
ImSee 47 C.F.R. § 51.705(a) (1).
101 See id. § 51.707. The FCC's proxy rates for termination provide for a range of $0.002 to
$0.004 per minute, unless a state had established a rate less than or equal to $0.005 per minute
prior to August 8, 1996. See id.
lin See id. § 51.713. Unlike the regular billing procedure for calls between different networks,
in which the originating carrier collects the charge from the customer and then pays the other
carrier for the use of its network, a bill-and-keep arrangement eliminates the payment to the
other carrier for network use, allowing the originating carrier to retain all of the revenue from
the call. If the amount of telephone traffic in each direction is equal and each network's cost is
equal, then each carrier ends up collecting roughly the same amount of revenue without having
to incur the expense of billing and collecting from the other carrier.
I " See 47 U.S.CA. § 252(i) (West Supp. 1997); see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
104 47 C.F.R. § 51.809(a) (emphasis added).
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requirement only by showing the state commission either that the costs
of providing the service to the requesting competitor are greater than
the costs of providing the service to the original competitor or that the
provision of the particular service to the requesting competitor is not
technically feasible.m The rule thus permits new entrants to "pick and
choose" the lowest priced individual elements from among existing
agreements without having to accept all of the terms of the agree-
ments)°6 In addition, new entrants can demand that their rates be
adjusted if the incumbent LEC and a later entrant agree to rates that
are lower than the rates agreed to by the original new entrants.'° 7
C. Background of Common Law and Economic Theory
To understand more fully each side's arguments regarding this
dispute, some basic background material regarding previous court
cases and economic theory is necessary. The first case addresses the
general nature of an agency's discretion in interpreting a statute) 08
The second case involves a specific application of a statute that governs
the regulation of the telecommunications industry.m Finally, some
basic economic theory addresses the reasoning behind certain mana-
gerial decision-making."°
The dispute here concerns a federal agency's interpretation of a
statute and a court's deference to that interpretation. Chevron v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, decided in 1984, is the preeminent case
regarding this issue)" In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court
held that when reviewing an agency's construction of a statute admin-
istered by that agency, a court should determine whether Congress has
directly spoken to the issue in question." 2 If so, the court must give
effect to the clearly expressed intent of Congress, regardless of the
agency's interpretation." 3 If not, the court may not impose its own
construction of the statute, but rather must defer to the agency's
interpretation as long as that interpretation is reasonable." 4
1 " See id. § 51.809(h).
1 °6 See id. § 51.809(a).
157 See id.
1 " See infra notes 111-21 and accompanying text.
10° See infra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
Ito See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
11
 I 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
112 See id. at 842.
113 See id. at 842-43.
114
 See id. at 843.
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In Chevron, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") issued
regulations defining the term "stationary source" of air pollution in
the context of the Clean Air Act ("CAA")."5 The CAA prohibited
certain states from issuing permits for new stationary sources of air
pollution unless they met several stringent requirements. 16 The EPA's
definition of "stationary source" provided for a "bubble" concept, in
which an entire plant, rather than each individual pollution-emitting
device, was viewed as a stationary source." 7 The respondents sued to
have this definition of "stationary source" reviewed and set aside by the
courts, arguing for a return to the EPA's original definition of "station-
ary source," which provided that each individual pollution-emitting
device was viewed as a stationary source."8 In upholding the EPA's
definition of the term "stationary source," the Court reasoned that
because Congress does not always legislate every detail, and because
an agency whose purpose is to administer congressional edicts has
more expertise than a reviewing court, a court should not substitute
its judgment for that of an agency unless an agency's judgment is
clearly at odds with a statute's provisions or the regulations are arbi-
trary and capricious." 9 The Court held that a reviewing court must give
controlling weight to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute
unless Congress has expressed its intent, in which case a reviewing
court must give effect to that express intent.'" The Court thus upheld
the EPA's definition of "stationary source." 12 '
In 1986, in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, the United
States Supreme Court held that section 2(b) of the 1934 Act denies
the FCC the power to preempt state regulation of depreciation for
intrastate rate-making purposes.' 22 The issue in question was whether
the FCC could preempt the rate-setting procedures of state regulatory
commissions with regard to accounting practices for state-regulated
telephone companies. 125 In the early 1980s, the FCC issued several
orders regarding the procedures for calculating depreciation of tele-
115 See id. at 840.
118 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
117 See id. Thus, a plant could modify or add pollution-emitting devices without meeting the
stringent permit requirements as long as the total emissions from the plant did not increase. See
id.
118 See id. at 841, 857.
119 See id. at 843-44.
1" See id. at 842-44.
121 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
122 476 U.S. 355, 373 (1986).
12.7
	 id. at 358.
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phone company assets.' 24
 The FCC initially issued a memorandum
stating that states were not required to follow these procedures when
calculating depreciation for the purposes of intrastate rate-making.'"
Later, the FCC reversed itself and declared that these orders preemp-
ted conflicting state procedures, in effect requiring state rate-making
commissions to follow the FCC's accounting procedures for purely
intrastate purposes. 128 In holding that section 2(b) of the 1934 Act bars
the FCC from preempting state commissions, the Court acknowledged
that the theoretical split between interstate matters regulated by the
FCC and intrastate matters regulated by states was in practice not
possible because the same equipment is used for both interstate and
intrastate purposes.' 27
 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a regu-
latory split between inter and intrastate functions is possible and fur-
ther found that section 2(b) precludes the FCC from regulating the
purely intrastate portion.' 28
The Court began by noting the conflict between various sections
of the 1934 Act.'" Section 151 states that the purpose of the 1934 Act
is to regulate interstate communications in order to create an efficient,
nationwide communications service. 19° Congress created the FCC in
order to implement this stated purpose.' 3 ' Section 220 states that•the
FCC shall prescribe the methods of depreciation to be used by com-
munications carriers. 132 0n the other hand, section 2(b) states that the
1934 Act shall not be construed as granting jurisdiction to the FCC
over matters relating to intrastate pricing procedures.'" The FCC's
position was that section 220 should be read as a grant to the FCC of
exclusive jurisdiction for determining depreciation methods for all
communications carriers.'" The FCC argued in the alternative that it
is entitled to preempt conflicting state law when it frustrates a clearly
' 2 ' See id. at 360-61.
' 25 See id. at 361-62.
' 26
 See id. at 362.
127 See Louisiana, 476 U.S. at 360.
123
 See id. at 370.
129 See id. at 365-68.
'" See 47 U.S.C.A. § 151. The section states, in relevant part, that its purpose is "regulating
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so
far as possible, to all the people of the United States, . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and
world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges
131
 See Louisiana, 476 U.S. at 369.
1 " See 47 U.S.C.A. § 220 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997).
133 See id. § 152(b). For the text of this section, sic supra note 5.
134 See Louisiana, 476 U.S. at 366-67.
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defined federal policy.'" The states responded that section 2(b) clearly
prohibits the FCC from regulating purely intrastate rate matters.'"
In light of these seemingly conflicting provisions of the 1934 Act,
the Court reviewed the different methods that Congress may use in
order to preempt state law.'" Among these are a clear congressional
intent to preempt state law and preemption by virtue of the fact that
state law stands in the way of the accomplishment and execution of
the objectives of Congress.'" The Court noted that both issues were
involved in this case, • but that both grounds ultimately failed as a
method of preempting state law.'" These two grounds failed because
nowhere in the statute did Congress clearly express its intent topre-
empt state law and because a federal agency cannot grant power to
itself to carry out a policy when Congress has not granted it that
power."° The Court thus concluded that in order to overcome the
jurisdictional bar on intrastate matters placed on the FCC by section
2(b), Congress must specifically grant the FCC this jurisdiction, which
in this case it did not."'
In addition to these cases, an introduction to economic theory is
helpful in understanding each side's position. In making a business
decision as to whether to make an investment, a manager must esti-
mate the anticipated revenues, compare them to the anticipated costs
of the investment, and then decide whether the excess of revenue over
cost, if any, is enough to justify the investment.H 2 In deciding which
costs to consider, the manager should look only at future (or marginal)
costs and ignore any "sunk" or historical costs.'" Because nothing can
be done about historical costs, they are irrelevant to the calculation of
costs from the time of the proposed investment looking forward, and
therefore should not play any role in the manager's decision to make
the proposed investment.'"
1 " See id. at 368.
155 See id, at 365-66.
I " See id. at 368-69.
I " See id.
' 39 See Louisiana, 476 U.S. at 369,373.
14° See id. at 373,374-75.
HI See id.
"2 See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 175-76 (14th ed. 1992).
IC See id.
144 See id. A good example of this principle, called the "marginal principle," is the Shoreham
nuclear power plant on Long Island. See id. The owner of the plant spent six billion dollars by
1991, but had not yet received an operating license. See id. At that point, in the decision as to
whether to continue to pursue the license or abandon the plant, the six billion dollars already
spent was completely irrelevant. See id. The only costs to be considered were those costs that the
owner would incur from that point forward. See id.
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D. The Dispute
On, August 8, 1996, the FCC issued its First Report and Order
("FRO"), containing all of the above regulations, which were published
in the Federal Register on August 29, 1996 and took effect September
30, 1996.' 45 Shortly thereafter, numerous state regulatory commissions
and incumbent LECs filed suit, seeking an injunction against enforce-
ment of the regulations.'" The suits were consolidated into Iowa Utili-
ties Board v. FCC, which was heard by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 147 After an initial hearing, the court
issued a temporary injunction against enforcement of portions of the
regulations shortly before they were to take effect.'" After oral argu-
ments on October 3, 1996, the court, on October 15, 1996, extended
its injunction until it could make a decision on the merits after full
oral arguments and submission of briefs. 145 After considering the four
criteria for issuing an injunction, the court found that an injunction
was warranted."° The court determined that at first glance the peti-
tioners were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the
FCC's regulations were beyond the scope of its authority or were
contrary to Congress's intent and that the petitioners were likely to
suffer irreparable harm if an injunction was not issued. 1 " On July 18,
1997, the court issued its decision on the merits, described more fully
below, affirming its initial belief that the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction
in issuing the pricing regulations and that the pick-and-choose rule
was an unreasonable interpretation of the TCA. 152
II. THE COMPETING ARGUMENTS AND THE COURT'S DECISION
• A. RBOCs'/State Commissions' Arguments
The parties opposing the FCC's proposed regulations consisted
mainly of the LECs and RBOCs, along with state regulatory boards.' 53
The two main thrusts of the opponents' arguments were that the FCC
has no authority to set rates and procedures for intrastate telecommu-
145 See FRO, supra note 18.
146 See Iowa II, 109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1996) (order granting preliminary injunction).
147 1d.
146 See Iowa I, 96 F.3d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. Sept. 27, 1996) (per curiam) (order granting
temporary restraining order).
"9 See Iowa II, 109 F.3d at 427.
15° See id.
151 See id. at 423, 426.
152 See Iowa III, 120 F.3d 753, 800, 801 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997).
155 See Iowa II, 109 F.3d at 418.
December 1997] 	 7ELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 	 169
nications under the TCA and that the rates and procedures set by the
FCC are either unconstitutional or are contrary to Congress's intent
as expressed in the TCA. 154 The RBOCs discussed both of these argu-
ments, with more emphasis on the illegitimacy of the rates and proce-
dures, while the state commissions focused solely on the FCC's lack of
authority to set intrastate rates.' 55 Each of these arguments will be
discussed in turn.
1. FCC Lacks Authority to Set Rates and Procedures for Intrastate
Telecommunications
The petitioners first focused on whether the FCC has jurisdiction
to set rates and procedures for intrastate telecommunications.' 56 Sec-
tion 2(b) of the 1934 Act provides that "nothing in this Act shall be
154 See generally Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE, Iowa /// (No.
96-3321); joint Brief the State Commission Parties, Iowa III (No. 96-3321). The RBOCs stated
that this case involved four issues:
1. Whether the FCC has jurisdiction to issue regulations, binding on thc States,
dictating the prices and other terms and conditions of local interconnection,
unbundling of network elements, and resale of services ...
2. Whether the FCC's pricing methodologies and proxy prices are contrary to the
plain terms and express intent of the [TCA] and would interpret the [TCA] to
. effect an unconstitutional taking of carriers' property by systematically depriving
them of the opportunity to earn a fair return consistent with the Fifth Amendment
3. Whether the FCC's rules on unbundled network elements and resale of services
violate the plain terms of the [TCA], thwart Congress's intent to encourage facili-
ties-based competition, and would effect an unauthorized taking of private property
without just compensation . .
4. Whether the FCC's proxy prices and pick-and-choose rule improperly displace
and unlawfully subvert the system of private negotiations established by Congress.
Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies, and GTE at xi, Iowa III (No. 96-3321). The state
commissions slated that the issues were:
1. Whether the FCC may properly prescribe to state commissions the methodol-
ogy for determining intrastate rates that local telephone companies charge com-
petitors .	 notwithstanding § 2(b) of the [1934 Act) 	 . .
2. Whether the FCC correctly concluded that §§ 251,252 and 253 of the [TCA]
abrogate, implicdly repeal or preempt § 2(b) of the 1934 Act .
3. Whether the FCC's facial preemption of all state pricing determinations for
intrastate services other than those resulting from its prescribed pricing methodol-
ogy is impermissibly overbroad . . . . '
5. Whether the FCC's interpretation of the [TCA] violates the Commerce Clause,
Tenth Amendment, and the spirit of the Guarantee Clause to the United States
Constitution.
Joint Brief for the State Commission Parties at 1-2, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
155 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 16-20, Iowa III (No.
96-3321); Joint Brief for the State Commission Parties at 11-14, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
156 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 21, Iowa III (No. 96-3321);
joint Brief for the State Commission Parties at 14, Iowa III (No. 96-3321),
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construed to apply or to give the (FCC] jurisdiction with respect to
charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for
or in connection with intrastate communication . . . . "157 Under the
holding of Louisiana Public Service Commission tt FCC, only a clear and
unambiguous grant of authority to the FCC by Congress will overcome
this jurisdictional bar.' 58
 The petitioners believed that there is no clear
and unambiguous grant of intrastate regulatory authority in the stat-
ute, and therefore section 2(b) bars the FCC from implementing its
proposed intrastate regulations.'"
To support this position, the petitioners pointed to the legislative
history of the relevant sections of the TCA.'" Earlier versions of the
TCA would have excepted sections 251 and 252 from the applicability
of section 2(b), thus allowing the FCC to regulate these intrastate
matters. 161 After intense lobbying by state regulators, however, this
exception was deleted from the final bill poised by Congress and
signed by President Clinton.' 62 The petitioners argued that the dele-
tion of this provision from the final bill evidenced Congress's intent
that the existing regulatory framework of split jurisdiction not be
disturbed.'" Because the statute contains no clear language granting
jurisdiction over intrastate matters and because Congress deleted a
proposal to grant this jurisdiction to the FCC, the petitioners argued
that Congress has not granted the clear and unambiguous authority to
the FCC necessary to overcome section 2(b)'s jurisdictional bar. 184
Thus, the petitioners argued, the FCC has no jurisdiction to promul-
gate the proposed regulations.' 65
In addition, the petitioners argued that not only did Congress not
grant the FCC the authority to regulate intrastate pricing, it expressly
granted this authority to the states. 166 They pointed to section 252(d),
which specifically addresses pricing standards, and section 252(c),
157 47 U.S.C.A. § 152(b) (West Sapp. 1997).
156 476 U.S. 355,377 (1986).
156 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 25, Iowa III (No. 96-3321);
Joint Brief for the State Commission Parties at 16, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
166 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 23-24, Iowa III (No.
96-3321); Joint Brief for the State Commission Parties at 18-20, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
161 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 23, Iowa III (No. 96-3321)
(citing S. 652, 104th Cong. § 101(c) (2) (1995) and H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 101(e) (1) (1995)).
162 See Joint Brief for the State Commission Parties at 19, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
163 See supra note 160.
164 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 21-25, Iowa III (No.
96-3321); Joint Brief for the State Commission Parties at 14-20, Iowa Ill (No. 96-3321).
163 See supra note 164.
156 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 26, Iowa III (No. 96-3321);
joint Brief for the State Commission Parties at 22,26, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
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which addresses state arbitration standards)" According to the peti-
tioners, the language and structure of these provisions specifically
grant the states the power to set prices while providing limited circum-
stances in which the states must follow the FCC's regulations.'" The
petitioners thus argued that it is clear that Congress intended for the
states to have the sole power to set rates, and also that the states shall
follow the FCC's regulations only where those regulations are .specifically
Inentioned.m Because the text is so clear and the FCC's regulations are
mentioned only in areas outside the rate-setting procedure, the peti-
tioners concluded that Congress intended the states, and not the FCC,
to have rate-setting power)"
The petitioners also argued that the FCC cannot resort to judicial
deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute."' First, under the
holding in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, a court must
defer to the express intent of Congress, regardless of the agency's
interpretation."' According to the petitioners, because the statute
clearly expresses Congress's intent to grant the power to set rates to
the states, the court must defer to Congress's intent and not to the
FCC's interpretation)" They also argued that because section 2(b) of
the 1934 Act provides that nothing in the Act should be construed as
giving the FCC jurisdiction over intrastate pricing matters, the FCC is
prohibited from exercising its own statutory construction contrary to
the Act's provisions."' Thus, the petitioners argued that the court
should not give deference to the FCC's interpretation of the TCA.'"
2. The FCC's Pricing Rules Are Contrary to the Intent of the TCA
The RBOCs next argued that whether or not the court decided
that the FCC lacked the appropriate jurisdiction, the court should find
1 " See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 26, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
laB See id. at 26-27. Section 252(d) (1) provides that the state commission shall make a
determination of just and reasonable rates in an arbitration setting, while section 252(d)(2)
provides that the state commission shall determine if a carrier's reciprocal compensation arrange-
ments arc just and reasonable. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 252(d) (1), (2) (West Supp. 1997). Section
252(c) provides that the state commission shall ensure that its decision meets the requirements
of section 251, including any regulations proinulgated by the FCC pursuant to that section; it
also provides that the decision shall establish rates according to section 252(d). See id. § 252(c).
169 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 27-28, Iowa III (No.
96-3321).
170 5ee id.
171 See id. at 30.
172 467 U.S. 837,842-44 (1984).
173 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 30, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
171 See id. at 31.
173 See id.
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that the proposed pricing regulations are invalid because they are
contrary to the plain terms and express intent of the TCA.'" The
RBOCs argued that if the court found that the FCC lacked jurisdic-
tion to promulgate its regulations, the court should not stop there.'"
Rather, the court should rule on the merits of the proposed regulations
because the FCC indicated that absent a judicial invalidation of its
regulations, it would apply them in situations in which it assumed
jurisdiction from a state commission pursuant to section 252(e) (5). 178
The RBOCs began by asserting that the FCC's pricing regulations
regarding interconnection and unbundled elements, which prohibited
state commissions from considering actual costs in determining rates,
are contrary to the clear provisions of the TCA.'" The TCA provides
that the cost of providing a service should be the basis of the just and
reasonable rate for that service.'" It also provides that the rates may
include a reasonable profit.'" The RBOCs argued that because a car-
rier cannot make a profit without recovering all of its costs, the TCA
requires that states be permitted to set rates which will allow a carrier
to recover at least its actual costs.'" In two areas, however, the FCC's
regulations prohibit states from considering actual costs—the carrier's
historical or "embedded" costs and the carrier's actual forward-looking
costs of providing the service. 1 B" Instead, the FCC's regulations demand
that a state consider only forward-looking costs (ignoring any embed-
ded costs), and even then only the forward-looking costs of a hypo-
thetical network constructed with the most efficient technology (ignor-
ing any actual costs of the carrier's existing network).'" The RBOCs
argued that these regulations violate the TCA's plain language that
prices be based on costs, which means actual costs, or at least require
that state commissions be allowed to determine which costs to in-
elude. 185
' 75
 See id.
Ill See id.
178 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 31, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
Section 252(e) (5) provides, in relevant part, "[i]f a State commission fails to act to carry out its
responsibility under this section ... then the [FCC) shall issue an order preempting the State
commission's jurisdiction . ." 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(c)(5).
179 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 32, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
184 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d) (1). The section provides that state commissions shall determine
the "just and reasonable rate for interconnection of facilities and equipment ... and ... network
elements . ." Id.
1111 See id. § 252(d) (1).
182 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 33, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
183 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (1996).
184 See id.
185 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 34-35, Iowa III (No.
96-3321).
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The RBOCs next argued that the FCC's regulations regarding
wholesale pricing of retail offerings are similarly contrary to the plain
language of the TCA.I 88 Section 252(d) (3) provides that the whole-
sale price charged to a competitor shall be the retail price less the
costs avoided by selling at wholesale.'" The FCC's regulations pro-
vide that the price shall be the retail rate less any costs that are reason-
ably avoidable, and lists items to be treated as presumptively avoid-
able.'" Once again, the RBOCs argued that these regulations ignore
the plain language of the TCA and will ultimately prohibit the carriers
from recouping their actual costs because these costs may be unavoid-
able.' 89
The third regulation that the RBOCs argued is violative of the
plain language of the TCA regards rates for transport and termination
of calls between networks. 199 The TCA requires that rates must allow
for mutual and reciprocal recovery of costs by each carrier, and ad-
dresses the availability of bill-and-keep arrangements.'" The RBOCs
argued that the proposed FCC regulations violate the language of both
of these provisions.' 92 According to the RBOCs, the first is violated
because the FCC applied its TELRIC pricing methodology, which does
not provide for a recovery of a carrier's actual costs.'" The RBOCs
argued that the second provision is violated for two reasons: first,
because the regulations provide that under certain circumstances a
state may impose a bill-and-keep arrangement, even though the TCA
states that bill-and-keep arrangements must be agreed to by both par-
ties; and second, because the regulations provide that these bill-and-
keep arrangements may be imposed when the amount of traffic going
between networks is roughly equal, even though the TCA states that
these arrangements must ensure mutual recovery of costs.'" Thus, the
RBOCs argued, these regulations should not stand because the three
pricing provisions—interconnection and unbundled elements, whole-
196 See id. at 35.
197 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d) (3) (West Supp. 1997). For the full text of this section, see supra
note 55.
18$ See 47 C.F.R. § 51.609 (1996) (emphasis added).
189 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 35-36, Iowa III (No.
96-3321).
1" See id. at 36.
191 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d) (2).
192 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 36-37, Iowa III (No.
96-3321).
195 See id. at 36.
194 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d) (2); Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at
37, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
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sale prices and transport and termination charges—violate the plain
language of the TCA.' 95
 •
3. The FCC Proxy Prices Are Contrary to the TCA, Arbitrary and
Capricious
The petitioners argued that the FCC's proxy prices, designed as a
temporary measure while state commissions completed cost studies
based on the TELRIC method, are contrary to the TCA, arbitrary and
capricious.' 96
 They argued that because the proxy prices are based on
methodologies contrary to the TCA, the proxy rates are themselves
contrary to the TCA.' 97
 In addition, the proxy rates are arbitrary and
capricious because the methods used to calculate them are not based
on sufficient and accurate data and are not even calculated using the
TELRIC methodology required by the FCC itself.'"
4. Pricing Methodologies and Proxy Prices Will Undermine
Congress's Express Intent to Encourage Facilities-Based
Competition
Next, petitioners argued that the FCC's pricing methodologies
and proxy prices will undermine Congress's express intent to encour-
age facilities-based 'competition. 199
 Petitioners argued that Congress
created the local competition provisions of the TCA to encourage
facilities-based competition, and that the FCC acknowledges this pur-
pose.'w They argued that the effect of the pricing regulations is that
competitors will not construct new facilities, but instead will simply use
the incumbent LECs' networks.m This result arises, they posited, be-
cause competitors will build new facilities only if they feel they can
provide service at a lower cost than the incumbent, but no competitor
195 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 31-48, Iowa III (No.
96-3321).
196 See id. at 37-40.
197 Set id. at 37-38.
198 See id. at 38-39. For example, the Florida Public Service Commission pointed out that the
FCC's proxy rates for local loops in that state did not include certain costs required to be included
by the FCC's own regulations, and therefore were more than 20% lower than the average rate
set by the Florida commission. See id. at 41. The FCC, on its own motion, acted to correct some
of the more glaring mistakes. See Order on Reconsideration, Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, No. 96-98 (released Sept. 27,
1996).
199 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 40, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
200
 See id.
201 See id. at 41.
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can possibly provide service at a lower cost than the hypothetical
fully-efficient network upon which the FCC's pricing regulations are
baset1. 262 In addition, the RBOCs argued, not only will competitors not
build new facilities, but also the incumbent LECs will not upgrade their
existing networks because the LECs will never be able to recover their
costs under the FCC's pricing regulations. 2"3 Consequently, the peti-
tioners argued, the end result will not be the multiple technologically
improved networks that Congress envisioned, but rather a single net-
work with outdated technology. 26I
5. The FCC's Pricing Rules Violate the Constitution
The petitioners next argued that the statute cannot be construed
to permit the FCC's pricing regulations because doing so would con
stitute an unconstitutional taking without compensation. 20' They
pointed to established principles of statutory construction that require
a statute to be interpreted to avoid an unconstitutional result. 2°6 The
RI30Cs argued that under the FCC's pricing regulations, carriers
would be unable to recover not only their actual current costs, but also
the millions of dollars in assets that are un-depreciated because of the
previous scheme of strict regulation of asset depreciation schedules. 2 ° 7
They further argued that the carriers would not be able to recover
these costs through higher rates in other non-regulated businesses
because competitive pressures will drive rates in those businesses close
to the carrier's costs. 208 Thus, the petitioners argued, the TCA cannot
202 See id.
207 See id.
2°4 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Cotnpanics and GTE at 43, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
205 See id. at 43-44. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsr, amend. V.
202 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 44, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
A utility must be allowed to recover its costs, as well as to provide returns to its investors. See ed.
(citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 310 (1989)).
suri See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 95-47, Iowa III (No.
96-3321).
2°" See id. at 47-48, The FCC argued that the regulations do not constitute a taking because
as an overall pricing scheme, the regulations allow the carriers to achieve a fair rate of return.
See FRO, supra note 18, at tt.737. The petitioners claimed that the FCC's claim is based on its
assumption that the carriers will be able to receive higher rates in other non-regulated businesses.
See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 47-48, Iowa III (No. 96-3321). The
petitioners claim that existing Supreme Court precedent refutes the proposition that a partially
regulated entity may be forced to operate at a loss on the theory that its non-regulated businesses
will compensate for the confiscatory rates. See id. (citing Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad COMM' n,
251 U.S. 396, 399 (1920)). Furthermore, the FCC does not guarantee that these non-regulated
businesses will compensate for the carriers' losses due to the regulations. See id. at 48.
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be interpreted to allow the FCC's pricing regulations because this
would result in an unconstitutional taking.2°9
A second constitutional argument made by the petitioners was
that the regulations violate the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment. 2 t 0 According to the petitioners, the regulations violate the
Commerce Clause because the FCC is attempting to regulate purely
intrastate matters and also because they strip the states of their power
to regulate by forcing compliance with federal regulations. 2" The pe-
titioners also argued that the regulations violate the .Tenth Amend-
ment because they turn the states into federal field offices by imposing
the choice of either following federal regulations or relinquishing their
power to regulate intrastate matters. 2' 2
B. FCC's Arguments
The FCC, along with a coalition of long-distance carriers, argued
against the petitioners. These parties' arguments mirrored those of the
RBOCs and state commissions. 213
 First, they argued that the FCC did
209 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 48, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
The petitioners also argued that the regulations requiring carriers to allow competitors to use
their networks and operations effectively cause the nationalization of the carriers' private property
because the carriers will be forced to invest in their networks for the benefit of others without
receiving adequate compensation in return. See id. at 69.
21° See Joint Brief for the State Commission Parties at 36, Iowa III (No. 96-3321). The
Commerce Clause provides that: "Congress shall have power ... to regulate commerce ... among
the several States .. . ." U.S. Comr. art. I, § 8. The Tenth Amendment provides that "powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
211 See joint Brief for the State Commission Parties at 36-37, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
212 See id. at 37-38 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,176 (1992) (holding that
a federal statute requiring states to take title to low-level radioactive waste is unconstitutional
because it violates the Tenth Amendment by forcing a state to choose between two unconstitu-
tional choices, effectively turning states into federal field offices)). The petitioners also made
several other arguments. Among these is that the FCC regulations are contrary to Congress's
intent by requiring the following: an expanded definition of "network element" which includes
software and operators; carriers to unbundle all network elements that are capable of being
unbundled, not just those elements that the requesting carrier requires; and carriers to unbundle
and then re-bundle all network elements, thus allowing competitors to avoid the resale of retail
products pricing guidelines. See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 49-52,
53-56,64, Iowa III (No. 96-3321). In addition, they argued that the pricing regulations as a whole
would discourage the facilities-based competition that Congress desired and would displace the
system of private negotiations that Congress intended to create. See id. at 49,73.
215 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America, Iowa III (No. 96-3321). In the FCC's view, the relevant issues involved were:
Whether the [TCA] authorizes the FCC to adopt regulations implementing the
(TCA]'s pricing provisions . • . Whether the FCC's pricing rules reasonably and
lawfully implement the [TCA]'s pricing provisions in a manner that achieves the
[TCA]'s procompetitive objectives .... Whether the FCC's rules reasonably define
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have the authority to promulgate its regulations regarding intrastate
pricing.214 Second, those regulations are a reasonable interpretation of
the TCA and conform with Congress's intent. 215
1. The FCC's Regulations Are Within the Commission's Authority
The FCC first asserted that its regulations are within the scope of
its authority under the 1934 Act." The FCC viewed the statutory
language in section 251 and section 252 as creating a new relationship
between federal and state regulators." This new relationship is one in
which federal and state regulators do not each control their own
sphere but share overlapping responsibilities." In the FCC's view, its
duty is to issue rules of general applicability for the states to implement
in specific determinations." Given this new relationship and a need
for a uniform set of rules, combined with the FCC's traditionally broad
powers to implement regulations in furtherance of congressional goals,
the FCC argued that the statutory language grants the FCC the power
to issue the disputed regulations. 22° The FCC maintained that Con-
gress's intention for it to interpret the statute is supported by the TCA's
legislative history. 221 Thus, the FCC argued, the broad authorization
contained in the 1934 Act, combined with the new federal/state rela-
tionship outlined in the TCA, supports its authority to promulgate its
pricing regulations. 222
In addition, the FCC argued, section 2(b)'s jurisdictional bar does
not apply for several reasons.223 First, because the statutory language is
clear in granting the FCC authority to issue these regulations, there is
incumbent LECs' obligations to provide access to unbundled network elements
pursuant to section 251(c) (3) of the [TCA] . 	 .
Id. at Statement of Issues.
2 " See id. § I.
215 See id. §§ II, III, IV, V.
216 See id. § I .
217 See id. at Counterstatement,
215 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America at Counterstatement, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
215 See id.
2" See id. at Counterstatement, § 1(A).
921 See id. § I(A), The FCC pointed to to the fact that Senator Gorton, one of the Senate
managers of the bill, successfully fought a proposal to delete section 253(d), which directs the
FCC to preempt any state law that has the effect of prohibiting local competition, even though
he acknowledged that it was a very broad prohibition on state activities; and that another senator
noted the need to centralize authority in the FCC. See id.
222 See id. at Counterstatement, § 1(A).
223 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § 1(B), Iowa III (No. 96-5321).
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no need to "construe" the statutory language. 2 21 Second, section 2(b)
applies only to purely intrastate matters, while the regulations in ques-
tion involve both inter and intrastate matters. 225 Third, section 2(b) was
designed to prevent ancillary jurisdiction by the FCC, not to limit the
FCC's traditional jurisdiction to implement the regulations. 226
The FCC also argued that the language granting the states the
right to "establish" rates did not divest the FCC of rule-making author-
ity. 227 According to the FCC, making rules and establishing rates are
different functions.228 Even if states are required to follow the FCC's
rules, nothing in this arrangement violates the language of the statute
because states still retain their power to "establish" rates while the FCC
only issues rules. 229 Moreover, argued the FCC, different sections of the
TCA direct the FCC to issue regulations governing the establishment
of rates or direct the states to follow FCC regulations during the
rate-setting procedure. 25° Thus, the FCC argued, it has the authority to
promulgate its pricing regulations."'
The FCC further argued that practical considerations support its
interpretation of the statute. 232 The question is not whether the FCC
or the states will interpret the statute, because ultimately the federal
courts will be the final arbiters."' Rather, the FCC urged, the question
is whether this court review will take place efficiently under one set of
federal regulations, or inefficiently under fifty different sets of rules."'
Under our system of federalism, maintained the FCC, only the federal
government has the power to issue nationwide regulations."'
In addition, the FCC said, under the holding in Chevron, the court
should defer to the FCC's interpretation of the statute.236 The FCC ar-
224 see id,
225 See id.
226 See id. .
227 See id. § 1(C).
228 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § I(C), Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
229
 See id.
239 See 47 U,S.C.A. §§ 251(d)(1), 252(c) (1) (West Supp. 1997).
231 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § 1(C), Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
232 See id. § 1(D).
2" See id.
234 See id.
235 See id. The FCC argued that given the underlying principle that federal statutes should
have uniform applicability nationwide, it only makes sense that to implement Congress's goals,
a federal agency, not 50 separate slate agencies, should be the source of regulations. See id.
236 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § 1(F), Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
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gued that there is no ambiguity—the statutory language clearly grants
the FCC the power to issue its regulations—but if the court did find
ambiguity, it should defer to the FCC's interpretation. 237 According to
the FCC, this deference applies not only to substantive interpretation,
but also to interpretation of an agency's jurisdiction."8
2. The Regulations Lawfully Promote the Objectives of the TCA
The FCC's second major argument was that the regulations create
an environment in which Congress's goal of competition within the
local phone markets could be achieved. 239 The FCC argued that the
TELRIC pricing methodology is a reasonable interpretation of calcu-
lating costs for, the interconnection and unbundling requirements
assigned to incumbent LECs. 21° In addition, the provisions for calculat-
ing wholesale rates for resale, as well as those for pricing transport and
termination, are also reasonable interpretations of the TCA. 24 ' The
FCC further argued that the court should not or could not rule on
certain portions of the regulations, either because they were not ripe
for judicial determination or because the court would be exceeding its
jurisdiction. 242
In support of its TELRIC pricing methodology, the FCC, like the
petitioners, argued that the statutory term "cost" cannot be confined
to one definition. 243 The FCC, however, took the view that because it is
an ambiguous term, and because the FCC has the power to interpret
the ambiguous language, it should use a definition that best fulfills
Congress's intent, rather than use actual costs or allow the states to
decide which costs: to include. 244 According'to the FCC, to fulfill Con-
gress's intent of increasing competition, the agency should use a defini-
tion that fits within this context. 245 In a competitive environment, the
costs that are relevant are not historical costs, but rather forward-look-
ing costs. 246 Additionally, the FCC countered the petitioners' argument
that the TELRIC pricing methodology is contrary to the TCA's purpose
237 See id.
238 See id. (citing Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 28 F.3d
1281,1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
2" See id. § 11.
240 See id. § 11(A).
241 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § 11(B), (C), Iowa III (No, 96-3321).
242 See id. § II(D), (E).
245 See id. § II (A) (1).
2" See id
242 See id.
242 See SAmoutsois & NoknitAus, supra note 142, at 175-76; .see also MCI Communications
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because it will discourage facilities-based competition. 247 The FCC ar-
gued that Congress intended for competition to exist in both facilities-
based and non-facilities-based forms and that the TELRIC methodol-
ogy will encourage facilities-based competition in the long run.'" The
agency also argued that TELRIC does not pose a constitutional "tak-
ing," but merely represents what a competitive market would impose
upon a carrier. 249
In support of its regulations regarding resale of retail product
offerings, the FCC argued that practical and historical considerations
support its contention that "avoided" costs should mean any costs that
can be avoided by a reasonable LEC, rather than costs actually avoided
by an LEC. 25° As a practical matter, requiring an "actual costs avoided"
standard would not give any incentive to incumbent LECs to act effi-
ciently, because the wholesale rate to competitors would be based on
the LECs' actual costs, no matter what those costs are. 251 As a historical
matter, the FCC pointed out that many state regulatory commissions
had already interpreted this provision of the Act to require the states
to assess costs based on those that "reasonably can be avoided."252 In
addition, the FCC's standard avoids the self-regulation problem inher-
ent when an LEC is required to report its own avoided costs, especially
Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1116-17 (7th Cir. 1983). In MCI, the Seventh
Circuit stated:
[I]t is current and anticipated cost, rather than historical cost, that is relevant to
business decisions to enter markets and price products. The business manager
makes a decision to enter a new market by comparing anticipated additional
revenues (at a particular price) with anticipated additional costs .... The historical
costs associated with the plant already in place are essentially irrelevant to this
decision since those costs are 'sunk' and unavoidable and are unaffected by the
new product decision.
Id.
247 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § II(A) (1), Iowa 111,120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997) (No. 96-3321).
248 See id.
249 See id. § II(A) (2). The FCC argued that many investments made by carriers in recent years
were made under "price caps," which set rates based on maximum prices rather than a strict
rate-of-return formula, and therefore imposed some elements of a competitive market upon the
carriers. See id, § II(A) (2) (c). Thus, the carriers cannot claim that it is unfair to switch to a
regulatory scheme that suddenly imposes competitive market-like forces upon them. See id "Given
that the Fifth Amendment does not shield carriers from losses due to competition, neither should
it shield carriers from having to charge competitive rates." Id.
25° See id. § 11(B) (1).
251 See id.
252 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § 11(B) (1), Iowa III (No. 96-3321) (citing 47 C.F.R. § 51.609 (1996). The FCC listed
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, New York and Ohio as the states that have adopted this type of
standard. See FRO, supra note 18, at n.911.
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considering the fact that these reported avoided costs will form the
basis of pricing to a competitor.'"
In support of its pricing rules for transport and termination of
local telecommunications traffic, the FCC argued that its regulations
meet the statutory requirement of providing for "the mutual and
reciprocal recovery by each carrier of [its] costs:15' According to the
FCC, the TELRIC methodology provides for an adequate recovery of
costs.255 The FCC stated that the petitioners' arguments that bill-and-
keep arrangements must be voluntary and cannot be ordered by a state
commission are incorrect because section 252(d), in which the bill-
and-keep provisions are located, applies only when there is no volun-
tary agreement.'" The FCC also argued that the statutory requirement
of mutual recovery of costs should not be interpreted as an exact
dollar-for-dollar match, but rather a rough equivalent.'" Therefore,
according to the FCC, allowing the imposition of bill-and-keep arrange-
ments where the amount of traffic going each way is roughly equivalent
is acceptable because the carriers have the right to rebut the presump-
tion that a roughly equivalent amount of traffic in each direction
equates to a mutual recovery of costs. 258
The FCC also argued that its interpretation of incumbent LECs'
obligations to unbundle network elements do conform with the statu-
tory language. 259 The FCC stated that its expansive definition of "net-
work element," which includes not only physical equipment such as
loops and switches but also features such as databases, software and
operator services, is broader than the petitioners' suggested definition,
but still conforms to the statutory language. 26° In addition, the FCC
2" See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § II(B) (1), Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
459 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d) (2) (A)(i) (West Supp. 1997); see Brief for Respondents Federal
Communications Commission and United States of America § II(C), Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
255 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § II(C), Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
256 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d); Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission
and United States of America § II(C), Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
257 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § 11(C), Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
255 See id.
259 See id. § 111,
2" See id. § Ill (A). The TCA defines "network element" to include "a facility or equipment
used in the provision of a telecommunications service," as well as "features, functions, and
capabilities that arc provided by means of such facility or equipment." 47 U.S.CA. § 153(45)
(West Supp. 1997). The RBOC's definition of "network clement" limited that term to just the
physical equipment, "as well as the features, functions, and capabilities that arc produced by
means of such facilities or equipment." Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE
at 49-50, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
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argued, given the statutory language, the agency's regulations requir-
ing incumbent LECs to allow unbundled access at any technically
feasible point far any network element is just as reasonable as the peti-
tioners' argument that incumbent LECs are required to provide un-
bundled access only for network elements that the requesting carrier
needs. 26' Finally, the FCC argued that its regulations, which allow a
competitor to unbundle and then re-bundle all the necessary network
elements, do not contradict the purpose of the statute regarding resale
of existing retail product offerings, but rather supplement the resale
provisions by allowing a competitor an option as to how to provide its
services. 262
The FCC also denied the .petitioners' argument that the proxy
prices and pick-and-choose rule will undermine arbitration and nego-
tiations. 263 The FCC argued that the proxy prices were not a hindrance,
but rather facilitated those negotiations and arbitrations by providing
suggested guidelines to the negotiating parties and interim prices to
state regulatory commissions. 2tl According to the FCC, the proxy prices
provide an "icebreaker" for the negotiations, and allow the state regu-
latory commissions to comply with strict timing deadlines for imple-
menting arbitrated prices. 265 The FCC also argued that its pick-and-
choose rule will further Congress's intent and not undermine the
arbitration and negotiation process. 266 In the FCC's view, potential
competitors should be given "most favored nation" status, because
considering the inherent advantage incumbent LECs have in control-
ling the existing market, competitors need favorable rules in order to
compete effectively.2" The FCC believed that providing potential en-
trants with the most favorable portions of existing agreements between
LECs and other competitors fulfills this goal. 268 The FCC argued that
although the statutory language does not specifically state that existing
LECs must grant the same rates to competitors—the language speaks
261 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § 111(13), Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
222
 See id. § 111(C). The FCC pointed out that although unbundling and re-bundling network
elements will probably be a lower cost option than resale of retail products, it also carries a higher
risk, and therefore the occurrence of unbundling and then re-bundling will not be as great as
the LEC's claim. See id.
253 See id § IV.
264
 See id. § IV(A).
252 See id.
266 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § IV(A), (13), Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
267 See id. § nr(B) .
2613 See id.
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only of terms and conditions—this interpretation is reasonable given
the fact that the statutory language allows competitors to choose cer-
tain provisions of existing agreements without being forced to accept
others, 269 In addition, according to the FCC, the rule allows incumbent
LECs to avoid this rule by proving that differences in technical feasi-
bility or cost of providing the service justify treating the parties differ-
en tly. 270
C. Court's Decisions/Reasoning
In October 1996, in Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted an injunction against
enforcement of the portions of the FCC's regulations designed to
implement the local competition provisions of the TCA. 2" Numerous
telecommunications carriers and state regulatory boards had sued for
injunctive relief, and the Eighth Circuit, after combining the actions,
issued a temporary stay on September 27, 1996. 272 After hearing oral
arguments, the court on October 15 extended the stay until a full
hearing could be held and the issue decided fully on the merits.273 This
hearing took place on January 17, 1997.
269 See id.
270 See id.
271 109 F.3d 418, 427 (8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 96-3321) (order granting preliminary
injunction). The FCC released its FRO on August 8, 1996, with the regulations scheduled to take
effect on September 30, 1996. See FRO, supra note 18.
272 See Iowa I, 96 F.3d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. Sept. 27, 1996) (per curiam) (order granting
temporary restraining order).
275 See Iowa II, 109 F.3d at 427. Although the various parties seeking an injunction approached
the issue differently, the court concluded that the principal objection was the proposed pricing
rules. See id. at 422. The three pricing regulations are TELRIC for network element rates and
transport and termination rates, FCC proxy rates for state commissions to use temporarily in lieu
of FCC-mandated cost methodologies such as TELRIC and the pick-and-choose rule. See id. In
granting the injunction, the court considered the following four factors: the likelihood that the
party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits, the likelihood that the moving party will be
irreparably harmed, the prospect that others will be harmed if the court grants the stay and the
public interest in granting the stay. See id. at 423. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, these are the
factors a court should consider when determining whether to grant a stay. See id. (citing Arkansas
Peace Ctr, v. Department of Pollution Control, 992 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1993)). In light of
these four factors, the court concluded that it was justified in granting a stay of the pricing
provisions and the pick-and-choose rule. See id. at 423.
The court first concluded that the petitioners were likely, but not necessarily certain, to
succeed on the merits. See id. at 424. In reaching this conclusion, the court evaluated the
reasonableness of the FCC's interpretation of the TCA using the historical regulation of the
telephone industry as a reference point. See id. at 423-24. The court noted that section 252(d),
which indicates that state commissions have the authority to set 'just and reasonable rates" for
intrastate communications services, is consistent with the historical practice of states setting rates
for intrastate telephone service. See id. In addition, section 252(c) (2) directs states to establish
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rates according to section 252(d). See id. Nowhere in sections 251 or 252 is the FCC authorized
to set rates, nor are state commissions directed to obey the FCC's pricing rules. See id. The court
reasoned that the absence of any language authorizing the FCC to issue pricing guidelines or
directing state commissions to comply with FCC guidelines indicated that Congress intended to
grant authority over pricing of local telephone service to the state commissions and not to the
FCC. See id. at 424.
The court next discussed the FCC's contrary interpretation of the TCA. See id. Under the
rule antiounced by the Supreme Court in Chevron u Nalural Resources Defense Counci4 courts
must give deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an unclear statute. 467 U.S. 837,
843-45 (1984). Courts do not have to defer to an agency, however, if the agency's interpretation
conflicts with the plain meaning of the underlying statute. See id. at 842-43, 844. The court
indicated that upon its first review, it was skeptical that the FCC's interpretation giving the agency
authority to establish prices would override what seemed to be clear language granting the states
the authority to set prices. See Iowa II, 109 F.3d at 424-25.
The court also discussed the applicability of the rule announced in Louisiana Public Service
Commission v. FCC regarding exceptions to section 2(b) of the 1934 Act. See id. See generally 476
U.S. 355 (1986). For a discussion of Louisiana, see supra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
Section 2(b) provides that the 1934 Act shall not be construed to grant the FCC jurisdiction over
certain intrastate matters. See 47 U.S.CA. § 152(b) (West Supp. 1997). For the relevant text of
this section, see supra text accompanying note 5. En Louisiana, the Supreme Court determined
that in order to overcome the provisions of section 2(b), a statute must either contain a straight-
forward or unambiguous grant of intrastate pricing authority to the FCC or modify section 2(b)
itself. See 476 U.S. at 377. Although the court acknowledged that portions of the TCA contained
straightforward grants of authority to the FCC over some intrastate matters, it indicated that it
had been able to find neither a modification of section 2(b) nor any straightforward or unam-
biguous grants of authority regarding intrastate pricing. See Iowa II, 109 F.3d at 424-25. The court
concluded that based on a combination of the above factors, the petitioners were likely to succeed
on the merits of their appeal. See id. at 425.
The court then proceeded to the remaining three factors—the likelihood that the moving
party will be irreparably harmed, the prospect that others will be harmed if the stay is issued and
the public interest in granting the stay. See id. at 425-27. The court found that the likelihood of
irreparable harm to the petitioners existed in several areas—a breakdown in negotiations due to
competitors' holdouts for the FCC's proxy rates and after-the-fact renegotiating due to the
"pick-and-choose" rule; irrecoverable economic loss resulting from proxy rates that may be below
actual costs; and loss of customer goodwill. See id. at 425-26. Petitioners argued that competitors
would have no incentive to negotiate for any rate above the FCC-mandated proxy rates because
an impasse in negotiations would lead to a state commission arbitration hearing at which the
state commission could not impose any rate above the FCC proxy rate. See a. at 425. This would
restrict the traditional give-and-take of private negotiations, which is the method preferred by
Congress. See id. The state commissions noted that given the time constraints imposed in the
TCA, many commissions have felt obliged to impose the FCC proxy rates without the proper
knowledge as to whether these rates arc just and reasonable as required by the TCA. See id. The
FCC argued that the petitioners' claims of irreparable harm were speculative because the pricing
provisions were merely an option for states to consider, and therefore, there was no showing of
the required certain and imminent harm. See id. at 425-26.
Furthermore, the court found that this showing was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
likely irreparable harm. See id. In considering the third criterion, the court determined that if it
were to grant the stay, the harm avoided by the petitioners would outweigh the harm suffered by
other parties. See id. at 426. The court acknowledged that either way it ruled, one side would
suffer harm. See id. If it granted a stay and the regulations were later upheld, competitors and
the LECs would have to renegotiate their agreements to conform with the regulations. See id.
The court decided, however, that this inconvenience did not outweigh the difficulties involved if
the opposite occurred. See id. It would be easier to rewrite a non-conforming agreement to
conform with the FCC regulations if the stay was overruled than it would be to renegotiate an
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On July 18, 1997, the Eighth Circuit issued its decision on the
merits of the case. 271 In its opinion, the court held, inter alia, that the
FCC exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing its pricing regulations, and that
the FCC's pick-and-choose rule is an unreasonable interpretation of
the relevant provision of the TCA. 275 The court thus vacated the FCC's
pricing rules and the pick-and-choose rule. 276
In ruling that the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing its
pricing rules, the court first focused on the fact that the plain language
of the TCA provides no direct authority for the FCC to issue the pricing
regulations. 277 The court rejected the FCC's argument that section
251(d) of the TCA, in conjunction with the general rule-making pro-
visions of the 1934 Act, gives the agency parallel authority to regulate
intrastate pricing."' The court stated that section 251(d) was merely a
time constraint designed to ensure an expeditious issuance of regula-
tions, and that the general rule-making provisions of the 1934 Act
provides the FCC with only ancillary jurisdiction to issue regulations
that may be necessary to fulfill its objectives contained elsewhere in
that statute. 279 The court also rebuffed the FCC's attempt to compare
the TCA's regulatory framework to that of the Cable Act, in which the
FCC was given authority to set prices on an intrastate leve1. 280 The court
stated that not only was the Cable Act substantially different from the
TCA, but also that the structure of the Cable Act actually lent credence
agreement, formed in accordance with the regulations, if the regulations were later overturned.
See id.
Last, the court concluded that a stay would promote the public interest. See id. at 426-27.
The FCC argued that a stay would not promote the public interest because it would not maintain
the status quo and would impede the path to competition for local telephone service, but the
court rejected both of these arguments. See id. The court noted that before the FCC published
its regulations, the TCA's system of private negotiations among incumbent LECs and potential
competitors, backed by state-run arbitration, was operating in many states without interference
from the FCC. See id. The court also noted that states had historically been successful in
preventing incumbent LECs from charging excessive rates, and that the court had no reason to
doubt the states' ability to enforce rates that are just and reasonable, as required by the TCA. See
id. The court, after considering the four factors in determining whether a stay is justified, issued
a stay effective until oral argument could be heard and a decision made on the merits. See id. at
427.
274 See Iowa III, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997).
275 See id. at 800, 801. The FCC's jurisdiction over the pick-and-choose rule was not ques-
tioned; therefore, the court ruled on the merits of the rule. See id. at 801.,
270 See id. at 800, 801.
277 See id, at 794-96,
"8 See id.
275 See Iowa III, 120 F.3d at 794-96.
2" See id. at 795-96 (citing Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.)).
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to the RBOCs' arguments that the language of the TCA does not
authorize the FCC to regulate intrastate pricing. 281
After discussing the lack of FCC authority in the plain language
of the TCA, the court next discussed the role of section 2(b) of the
1934 Act. 282
 Section 2(b) fences off intrastate matters from federal
regulation unless Congress explicitly grants the FCC the authority to
regulate those matters or modifies section 2(b) itself, or if the regula-
tory framework meets the "impossibility" exception."' The court first
held that the language of the TCA does not constitute a straightfor-
ward grant of regulatory power to the FCC and therefore does not
circumvent the restrictions of section 2(b). 284
 The Eighth Circuit then
addressed the applicability of the impossibility exception to this situ-
ation, holding that the exception did not apply 285
The court first noted that telephone rate-making traditionally has
been separated into interstate and intrastate components, thereby fail-
ing the first requirement of the impossibility exception. 286 Secondly,
and to the court, more importantly, the FCC did not show that the
states' authority to set intrastate rates would negate the FCC's valid
authority to regulate interstate communications, thereby failing the
second requirement of the impossibility exception. 287
 The court stated
that based on an analysis of either the language of the local competi-
tion provisions of the TCA or the historical dichotomy of infra versus
interstate regulation, the FCC has no regulatory authority over intra-
state matters that state regulation would negate. 288
After vacating the FCC's pricing regulations, the court addressed
the pick-and-choose rule. 289
 The court stated that because the language
281 See id. "In sharp contrast to the [TCA], several provisions of the Cable Act explicitly grant
the [FCC] the authority to regulate the rates of cable companies and explicitly require state
authorities to follow the [FCC's] rate-making rules." Id.
282 See id. at 796-800.
288 See supra text accompanying notes 122-41. This narrow "impossibility" exception, which
has evolved out of Louisiana, provides that the FCC may regulate intrastate telecommunications
matters if (1) it is impossible to separate the interstate and intrastate components of the federal
regulation and (2) the state regulation would negate the federal regulation of interstate matters.
See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,375-76 n.4 (1986); California v. FCC,
39 F.Sd 919,931 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1050 (1995); NARUC v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422,
429 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
284
 See Iowa III, 120 F.3d at 794-96.
288 See id. at 796-800.
286 See id. at 798.
287 See id.
288
 See id. at 798-800. The court acknowledged that state regulation may have a tangential
effect on interstate services, but slated that this effect was not sufficient to overcome the operation
of section 2(b) and does not alter the fundamentally intrastate nature of the TCA's local compe-
tition provisions. See id. at 800.
289
 See Iowa III, 120 F,3d at 800-01.
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of the statutory provision underlying the pick-and-choose rule is am-
biguous, the court needed to look to the structure and language of the
statute as a whole in order to determine if the FCC's interpretation is
reasonable."9 In doing so, the court held that the pick-and-choose rule
is not a reasonable interpretation, and therefore vacated the rule."'
The court noted that the TCA's preference is for voluntarily negotiated
agreements between existing LECs and potential competitors, with
state-run arbitrations serving as a backstop. 292 The pick-and-choose
rule, according to the court, would thwart the preferred negotiation
process by discouraging the give and take necessary to any successful
negotiation, because existing LECs would be reluctant to make any
concession for fear that a later competitor would be able to receive
that concession without having to grant to the existing LEC the corre-
sponding benefit. 295 Not only would this undermine the preferred
negotiation process, the court noted, but it also would contradict the
terms of section 251(a), which requires that these agreements be
"binding:1294 The court also rejected the FCC's arguments that the
waiver provision of the pick-and-choose rule would allow the existing
LECs to negotiate with the traditional give and take, stating that the
waivers would probably be rarely granted and that the potential to
receive a waiver would not be enough to persuade the existing LECs
to make concessions during negotiations. 295 The Eighth Circuit thus
concluded that the pick-and-choose rule is an unreasonable construc-
tion of the relevant provision of the TCA because it conflicts with the
TCA's design to promote negotiated agreements. 296
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETING ARGUMENTS AND THE COURT'S
DECISION
The Eighth Circuit's decision to grant a stay and its subsequent
decision to vacate portions of the FCC regulations were correct."' The
court, however, should have taken the additional step of ruling on the
lawfulness of the regulations themselves, to avoid future litigation in a
situation in which the FCC applies the disputed regulations after ob-
taining the unquestioned jurisdiction provided for in section
296 See id. at 800.
291 See id. at 801.
292 See id.
292 See id.
294 See Iowa III, 120 F.3d at 801.
295 See Id.
996 See Id.
297 See infra notes 300-22 and accompanying text.
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252(c) (1), which provides that in certain circumstances a state com-
mission shall follow the regulations of the FCC; and section 253(d),
which grants power to the FCC to preempt any state or local rule that
effectively prohibits entry by any competitor into a local telephone
rnarket."7
These provisions, in the FCC's view, create a new "partnership"
between the FCC and state regulatory commissions, granting overlap-
ping regulatory functions to both parties. 3°3 0ther than section 201 (b),
however, none of these provisions explicitly states anything regarding
the FCC's authority to regulate pricing, and section 201(b)'s grant is
limited to interstate matters. 3°2 The FCC infers its power from the fact
that the statutory provisions of the TCA do not prevent the FCC from
regulating intrastate matters, arguing that Congress's passage of such
a significant restructuring of the regulatory scheme without specifically
barring the FCC from regulating intrastate matters represents a clear
and unambiguous grant of jurisdiction. 310 This grant eliminates the
need to "construe" the language, thereby overcoming section 2(b)'s
statutory bar.3 "
This argument lacks merit. The language of the statute is neither
clear enough to avoid the need to "construe" it, nor explicit enough
to consider it a clear and unambiguous grant of jurisdiction. 312 Had
Congress wanted to grant intrastate jurisdiction to the FCC, surely it
could have written explicit language to do so, or at least not have
deleted the proposal to exempt the pricing provisions from section
2 (b)ls jurisdictional bar—especially considering the radical change this
proposal would have had on the regulatory scheme in place for dec-
ades. 313 It seems more likely that the clear and unambiguous grant
needed to overcome section 2(b)'s bar is typified by section 251(e),
3" See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 201(b), 251(d) (1), 251(d)(3), 252(c)(1), 253(d) (West 1991 & Supp.
1997). For the relevant text of § 201(b), see supra note 4 and accompanying text. For the text of
§ 251(d) (1), see supra note 21. For the text of § 251(d) (3), see supra note 47. For the text of
§ 252(c)(1), see supra note 50. For the text of § 253(d), see supra note 60. The TCA did not
repeal the 1934 Act, but rather simply supplemented it. Thus, any provision of the 1934 Act, such
as § 201's general grant of power, is still in effect unless specifically repealed by a provision of
the TCA.
3 '38 See Brief for Respondents Federal Cotnmunications Commission and United States of
America at Counterstatement, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
909 See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 201(h), 251(d) (1), 251 (d) (3), 252 (c) (1) , 253(d).
3 I° See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § 1, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
5" See id.
512 See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 201(b), 251(d) (1), 251(d) (3), 252(c) (1), 253(d).
515 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 23-24, Iowa III (No.
96-3321).
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which grants the FCC exclusive jurisdiction regarding administration
of the North American Numbering Plan."'
Not only does the statute fail to grant the FCC jurisdiction to
regulate intrastate pricing, it explicitly grants this power to the state
regulatory commissions.315 The Eighth Circuit pointed out that histori-
cally, state commissions have regulated intrastate pricing, and the pro-
visions of the TCA seem consistent with this practice. 316 Section 252(d),
entitled "Pricing Standards," provides that state commissions shall
make determinations regarding the just and reasonable rates for inter-
connection and unbundled access and makes • no mention of the
FCC.31 Section 252(c) (2) states that the state commissions shall estab-
lish the rates for interconnection, services and network elements, and
again makes no mention of the FCC. 318 The FCC is mentioned in
section 252(c) (1), which requires state commissions to ensure that
arbitration resolutions meet the requirements of section 251, including
the FCC's regulations.zi° Thus, as the Eighth Circuit stated, Congress
directed the states to follow the FCC's regulations in certain instances,
which supports the conclusion that Congress intended the states to
follow the FCC's regulations only where specifically mentioned. 32° The
sections of the TCA that detail pricing guidelines contain no require-
ments that state commissions follow FCC regulations, which, when
combined with the state commissions' historical role of regulating
intrastate pricing, indicates that Congress intended the states, and not
the FCC,.to regulate intrastate pricing. 32 ' Therefore, because the lan-
guage of the TCA does not grant jurisdiction over intrastate rate-setting
procedures and is not a clear, unambiguous grant of authority neces-
sary to overcome section 2 (b) 's jurisdictional bar, the court was correct
in ruling that the FCC overstepped its authority in promulgating its
local telephone pricing regulations. 322
As discussed above, both sides argued not only the merits of the
FCC's claim of jurisdiction over intrastate rate-setting, but also whether
the court should rule on the validity of the regulations themselves if
the court found that the FCC lacked jurisdiction.323 Section 252(e) (5)
314
 See Iowa III, 120 F.3d at 794. For the text of § 251(e), see supra note 47.
313 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(c), (d).
316 See Iowa II, 109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1996) (order granting preliminary injunction).
317 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d).
318 See id. § 252(c) (2).
319
 See id. § 252(c) ( I).
32°
	 id.; Iowa III, 120 F.3d 753, 794 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997).
321
 See Iowa III, 120 F.3d at 794-800.
322 See supra notes 312-21 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 176-78, 242 and accompanying text.
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permits the FCC to preempt a state's jurisdiction over any proceeding
or matter if the state does not fulfill its responsibilities under the
TCA. 3" Absent a judicial determination that its regulations were inva-
lid, the FCC may apply the regulations in any situation in which it
acquired jurisdiction under section 252(e) (5). 325 Thus, because the
court ruled that the FCC lacked jurisdiction but did not address the
validity of the regulations themselves, the FCC might use the regula-
tions in any instance in which it gains the unquestioned jurisdiction
provided for under section 252(e) (5). 326
B. The Regulations Are Contrary to the Intent of the TCA
In an environment in which regulated marketplaces are being
transformed into competitive ones, the FCC must take steps beyond
simply allowing potential competitors to enter the marketplace."' As
discussed earlier, without access to the existing network at a reasonable
cost, competitors cannot make a profit and therefore will not enter the
marketplace.'" Congress took some steps to ameliorate some of these
problems by requiring incumbent LECs to offer unbundled access to
their networks, interconnection to existing networks and resale of
retail product offerings, thereby "jump-starting" the competitive proc-
ess.329 The FCC's pricing regulations seem not only to jump-start this
process, but also to accelerate it by fast-forwarding the competitive
process so that the starting point becomes what normally is the finish
line—a system in which efficiency and threat of entry by competitors
drive prices down to cost.'" This goal, however, cannot be achieved by
contradicting the provisions of the underlying statute."' Some of the
FCC's pricing regulations do so and therefore should not be allowed
324 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(e) (5).
323 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 31, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
748 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252 (e) (5).
3" See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § IV(B), Iowa III (No. 96-3321). A quote from President Lyndon Johnson, with regard
to affirmative action, seems appropriate to this situation. "You do not wipe away the scars of
centuries by saying: Now you arc free to go where you want, and do as you desire ... you do not
take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring to the starting
line of a race and then say, you are free to compete with all the others." President Lyndon
Johnson, Address at Howard University (1965).
328 See supra notes 243-70 and accompanying text.
749
	
47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West Stipp. 1997).
1" See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 42-43. Iowa III (No.
96-3321); KENNEDY, Supra note 8, at 129-31.
73l See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 43, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
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to stand. 332 But others do not contradict the TCA's provisions, and are
therefore valid interpretations of the statute. 333
1. TELRIC
The policy behind the FCC's decision to use long-run costs, incor-
porated in its TELRIC methodology, has support in the realities of
economic markets. 334 As the FCC correctly pointed out, the relevant
costs for potential competitors in a market are not historic costs, but
rather the future anticipated costs and offsetting anticipated reve-
nues. 335 Managers making investment decisions are not concerned with
sunk costs because these costs have no effect on whether the proposed
venture will be profitable from that time forward. 336 Managers are
concerned only with what costs they will incur in the future, and
whether these costs will be more than offset by future revenues. 337 Thus,
the emphasis on future costs which forms the basis of the FCC's
TELRIC pricing methodology is supported by economic theory and
reality. 838
The details of TELRIC, however, are more problematic, both in
the assumptions the FCC uses and in the fact that it is the only method
allowed in the regulations. The crux of the TELRIC methodology is
the assumption that the incumbent LECs use the most efficient tele-
communications technology and the lowest cost network configura-
tions, regardless of whether this assumption is true. 339 Thus, the cost to a
competitor to use the incumbent LEC's network will be lower than the
incumbent LEC's actual cost because no LEC can meet the cost as-
sumptions upon which TELRIC is based 84° In fact, the cost would be
the lowest possible cost had the competitor built its own network from
scratch using the most technologically advanced equipment in every
aspect of the network and ignoring any carrying costs, financing
charges and any other indirect costs of owning a network. 34 ' As a result,
a potential competitor is faced with a choice between two alternatives:
332 See infra notes 384-57,386-403 and accompanying text.
333 See infra notes 358-85 and accompanying text.
34 See KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 129-31.
333 See SAMUELSON & NORDDAUS, supra note 142, at 175-76.
336
 See id.
337
 See id.
338 See id.
3" See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
31° See Brief for Petitioners Regional Sell Companies and GTE. at 32-35, Iowa III (No.
96-3321); infra notes 391-96 and accompanying text.
341 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (1996).
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either build its own network, with the inherent risks, or purchase from
the incumbent at the same or lower cost than if it built its own net-
work. 342 Given this choice, a competitor almost always would choose
the latter because that choice allows the competitor to incur the same
or lower cost without the risk.'45
As a result most, if not all, potential competitors would choose to
purchase capacity from existing LEC networks rather than build new
networks.344 Although the FCC and the petitioners disagree on whether
facilities-based competition was the primary goal of the local competi-
tion provisions of the TCA, both sides do agree that it was at least a
factor. 343 Because the TELRIC methodology would likely cause compe-
tition using existing networks rather than through the construction of
new networks, the regulations would, in at least some part, thwart the
TCA's overall goal of providing for "private sector deployment of ad-
vanced telecommunications and information technologies and serv-
ices to all Americans."'"
The assumptions upon which TELRIC is based, practically speak-
ing, can never be achieved. 347 TELRIC assumes that the hypothetical
LEC always will be using the most efficient and most technologically
advanced equipment at all times. 348 Even if incumbent LECs upgraded
their equipment on a regular basis, new equipment always would be
on the market. 3" The new equipment would render the equipment just
installed no longer the most efficient and technologically advanced.'"
Because this type of equipment is expensive, the LECs are, for the most
part, stuck with what they have and can only do so much at a time."'
Add to this the limited capital available to LECs to purchase and install
new equipment and the result is a cycle in which LECs can never meet
the assumptions that form the cornerstone of the FCC regulations. 352
542 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and CTE at 41, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
545 See id.
544 See id.
5" See id. at 40; Brief for Respondents FCderal Communications Commission and United
States of America § II(A) (1), Iowa III (No. 963321).
946 S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996) (Conference Committee Report accompanying
TCA); see supra notes 342-45 and accompanying text.
347 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 33-34, Iowa III (No.
96-3321).
348 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (1996).
549 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 41-42, Iowa III (No.
96-8321).
336
	 id.
"I See id. at 42.
552 See id.
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The second problem of the TELRIC details is that TELRIC is the
only methodology permitted under the FCC's regulations."' The TCA
states that the rates set by state commissions must be based upon
"cost."554 Both parties agree that in the context of the telecommunica-
tions industry, the term "cost" can have several meanings, such as
historical cost, hypothetical cost, average cost and future cost.'" Con-
gress did not specify the meaning of "cost" but did provide that the
rates may include a profit.'" In sum, Congress did not specifically
define "cost"—the term itself has many meanings and the FCC's
authority to issue regulations in the first place is somewhat suspect. It
thus seems more reasonable that Congress intended the state commis-
sions to have more discretion in determining the rate-setting proce-
dures, as long as the resulting rates are in some way based on one of
the meanings of "costs."557
2: Resale Provisions
The resale pricing provisions, on the other hand, are a reasonable
interpretation of the TCA."" The discount from the retail rate that
incumbent LECs are to charge to competitors is based on costs that
reasonably can be avoided.'" Like the TELRIC pricing methodology,
these regulations do not consider actual costs, but rather hypothetical
costs—in this case, costs avoided."° The TCA requires that the state
commission set the wholesale rate at the retail rate less any marketing,
billing, collection and other costs that will be avoided by the incumbent
LEG."' The FCC's interpretation adds a reasonableness component: it
requires a discount based on costs that may be reasonably avoided by
the incumbent LEC, not just on costs that are actually avoided." 2
The addition of a reasonableness requirement is a sensible inter-
pretation of the TCA's provisions because, unlike the TELRIC meth-
555 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505. The state commissions can choose proxy rates as a temporary
alternative, but TELRIC is the only methodology allowed for the permanent rate-setting proce-
dure. See id.
354 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d)(1) (A) (i) (West Supp. 1997).
555 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 33, Iowa III, (No. 96-3321);
Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of America § II
(A) ( I), Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
556 See 47 U.S.CA. § 252(d) (1)(B).
557 See supra notes 300-22, 353-56 and accompanying text.
555 See infra notes 359-74 and accompanying text.
559 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.609 (1996).
569 See id.
561 See 47 U.S.CA. § 252(d) (3).
562 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.609.
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odology, it reflects the practical realities involved and does not place
an undue burden on the incumbent LECs. 363 Basing rates on an in-
cumbent LEC's actual avoided costs causes two problems."^ First, it
provides no incentive for the incumbent to act efficiently because the
competitors' costs will be based upon the incumbent's actual costs, no
matter what they are. 365 Second, it results in the awkward position of
having the incumbent LEC, which obviously has a vested interest in
keeping this figure as low as possible, calculate these avoided costs.'"
Both of these problems conflict with the overall goal of the local
competition provisions of the TCA, which is to lower the cost of local
telephone service through the introduction of competition. 967
The reasonableness requirement differs from the efficient costs of
a hypothetical LEC upon which the TELRIC methodology is based.
Although both require a calculation based upon assumptions that may
not be necessarily true, there is an important difference. Specifically,
the TELRIC assumptions are largely out of the control of incumbent
LECs and can never practically be achieved, while the wholesale rate
assumptions are realistic and are largely within the incumbent LEC's
contro1. 3"
The FCC regulations regarding resale of existing retail products
list a number of costs that are presumptively avoidable. 369 The costs,
such as sales, product advertising and customer services, are costs that
are variable and related either directly or indirectly to the retail prod-
ucts."' These types of costs are much more easily controlled by the
incumbent LEC because they are based either on employee labor or
purchasing services from outside of the corporation and therefore can
be adjusted relatively quickly." Because the company can control the
factors involved in meeting the assumptions that form the basis of the
367 See infra notes 364-74 and accompanying text.
364 See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
569 See supra note 251 and accompanying text. This efficiency idea is the driving force behind
the regulatory shift from profit caps to rate caps for regulated utilities. See KENNEDY, supra note
8, at 145. By regulating profits, states provided no incentives fur utilities to act efficiently, because
the utilities could not earn more by acting more efficiently. See id. By switching to rate regulation,
states achieved their primary goal of ensuring reasonable prices for consumers, while utilities
became more efficient because they were no longer limited in the amount of profits they could
earn. See id.
365 See Brief for Respondents Federal Communications Commission and United States of
America § II(B) (1), Iowa III, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Gr. July 18, 1997) (No. 96-3321).
367 See Iowa III, 120 F.3d at 791-92.
/68 See infra notes 371-74 and accompanying text.
369 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.609(c) (1996).
376 See id.
37] See. KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 132-34.
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rate provisions, the incumbent LEC has the choice of whether to meet
those assumptions."2 Unlike TELRIC, which provides for assumptions
that an LEC cannot meet even if it chooses to do so, the resale
provisions provide for assumptions that can be met by an incumbent
LEC if it chooses to do so," 3 Where a regulated company chooses not
to become more efficient, its competitors should not be forced to
suffer because of that •choice; where a regulated company cannot
possibly meet regulatory standards even if it chooses to do so, its
competitors should not be allowed to benefit. Thus, because the whole-
sale rate provisions are based on assumptions that the regulated parties
can meet if they so choose, these provisions differ from the TELRIC
provisions and are not contrary to the intent of the TCA ." 4
3. Transport and Termination Rates
The rates that state commissions are to set for transportation and
termination ("T&T") of telecommunications traffic are based on the
FCC's TELRIC pricing methodology."5 TELRIC is not a valid embodi-
ment of the TCA's requirements; the provisions for setting the T&T
rates using TELRIC are correspondingly invalid."6 The other por-
tion of the T&T provisions involve bill-and-keep arrangements." 7 The
RBOCs' two arguments discussed above—that the regulations are con-
trary to the TCA because they allow a state commission to impose a
bill-and-keep arrangement without the parties' consent and when the
traffic in each direction is only roughly equivalent—do not render the
regulations invalid."8
The first argument is based upon the RBOCs' belief that the text
of the TCA allows a bill-and-keep arrangement only if both parties
voluntarily agree to it."9 This section of the TCA, however, does not
require that a bill-and-keep arrangement be entered into voluntarily.'"
Rather, it merely precludes a state from preventing two carriers from
voluntarily entering into such an agreement, and thus does not sup-
port the RBOCs' argument that the TCA does not allow a state com-
mission to impose a bill-and-keep arrangement involuntarily."' The
372 See id.
373 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.609.
974 See supra notes 358-73 and accompanying text.
373 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.705(a) ( I).
376 See supra notes 354-57 and accompanying text.
377 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.713.
378 See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
379 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d) (2) (B) (West Supp. 1997).
58° See id.
961 See id.
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second argument is based on the possibility that even if traffic is equal
in each direction, costs for each carrier may not be equal. 382 The TCA
requires "mutual" recovery of costs; the FCC regulations require that
telecommunications traffic in each direction be "roughly balanced,"
which the FCC assumes would lead to approximate mutual recovery of
costs."' Even if the RBOCs are correct that costs may differ when the
amount of traffic is equal, the regulations provide for an opportunity
for the incumbent LEC to rebut the presumption that costs are equal
when the amount of traffic is equal. 384 Thus, because the regulations
provide this opportunity to rebut the reasonable presumption of cost
equivalence when traffic amounts are equivalent, the T&T regulations
are a reasonable interpretation of the TCA. 383
4. Proxy Rates and the Pick-and-Choose Rule
Because the TCA imposes strict deadlines on state commissions
for arbitrating negotiations between incumbent LECs and potential
competitors, the FCC developed proxy rates for state commissions to
use as temporary rates while long-term cost studies could be con-
ducted. 386 The proxy rates cover unbundled access, wholesale rates for
resale of retail products and T&T rates. 387 The proxy prices are invalid
for two reasons. First, the method the FCC used to calculate the proxy
rates was arbitrary and unscientific and violated the FCC's own regu-
lations; second, they undermine the TCA's system of private negotia-
tions.'"
The FCC's main pricing methodology is TELRIC—used to calcu-
late an LEC's costs for purposes of setting rates based on those costs.'"
In calculating its proxy rates, however, the FCC did not use the TELRIC
methodology, thereby contradicting its own policy. 360 The data it did
use were incomplete; the FCC used limited data from an expedited
rule-making process involving a small number of states and extrapo-
lated that data into nationwide rules. 36 ' TELRIC is based upon a scien-
382 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 37, Iowa III, 120 F.3d 753
(8th Cir. July 18, 1997) (No. 96-3321).
383 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(d) (2) (A) (i); 47 C.F.R. § 51.713(b) (1996).
384 See 47 C.F.R. § 51,713(c).
383 See supra notes 379-84 and accompanying text.
388 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.513, .611, .707.
387 See id.
388 See infra notes 389-403 and accompanying text.
389 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505.
390 See FRO, supra note 18, at nn.792-98; Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and
GTE at 38-39, Iowa III, 120 F,3d 753 (8th Cir. July 18, 1997) (No. 96-3321).
591 See supra note 390.
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tific, fact-specific study of a particular LEC, and the method the FCC
used clearly did not follow 4.392
Not only are these proxy rates arbitrary, but they also undermine
the system of private negotiations preferred by the drafters of the
TCA. 393 The text of the TCA supports the idea that the preferred
method of introducing competition into local markets is through ne-
gotiated agreements between incumbent LECs and potential com-
petitors. 394 For these negotiations to work, however, the regulatory
framework surrounding them cannot serve to undermine those nego-
tiations."95 This is what the proxy rates, in conjunction with the pick-
and-choose rule, do. 396 Most state commissions will probably have to
resort to the proxy rates because of the extensive time needed to
complete the TELRIC cost studies. 397 Knowing this, potential competi-
tors have no reason to negotiate any agreement that will set rates
higher than the FCC proxy rates. 398 This in turn will result in delayed
entry into the market by competitors because the state arbitration
process takes a substantial amount of time. 399 This delay is contrary to
the TCA's preference for timely negotiated agreements. 409 Even if par-
ties eventually do reach an agreement, it can be undermined by the
pick-and-choose rule."' This rule undermines the finality of a negoti-
ated agreement by allowing a competitor to pick and choose the best
rates, terms and conditions of any other agreement an incumbent LEC
has with another competitor and to incorporate it into its own agree-
ment, even after an agreement has been negotiated. 402 Thus, any agree-
ment entered into by an LEC with a competitor is always subject to
change, which inherently undermines any negotiated agreement. 403
392 See 47	 § 51.505; FRO, supra note 18, at nn.792-98. It seems particularly egregious
for a federal agency, acting with questionable jurisdiction and limited data, to set preemptive
rates for each facet of telecommunications without consulting the state commissions whose
historic role has been to set these rates on a recurring basis.
393 See infra notes 394-403 and accompanying text.
394 See 47 U.S.CA. § 252(a), (b) (West Supp. 1997).
393 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 1, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
396 See infra notes 397-403 and accompanying text.
397 See FRO, supra note 18, at n.767.
399 See Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies and GTE at 74, Iowa III (No. 96-3321).
399 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(13). When a state commission arbitrates a dispute between an
incumbent LEC and a potential competitor, the total amount of time can be up to nine months
from when the potential competitor asks to negotiate with the incumbent LEC until the rates are
actually set. See id.
499 See id. § 252(a), (b).
401 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.809(a) (1996). For the relevant text of the rule, see supra text accom-
panying note 104.
4" See Id.
403 See id. In addition, the "pick-and-choose" rule has a questionable textual base. It is based
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IV. CONCLUSION
The transition from a regulated telephone market, dominated by
monopolists, to a free-wheeling competitive market is a difficult exer-
cise in balancing the interests of the existing carriers, potential com-
petitors, state regulators and consumers. 4 U4 With the TCA, Congress
attempted to pave the way into this new world by establishing goals and
delegating the responsibilities necessary to achieve those goals. 405
Within the regulated telephone industry, these responsibilities often
overlap, which caused the dispute involved in this case."6
The RBOCs, along with the state regulators, have a vastly different
view of each party's respective roles than does the FCC.4" In the FCC's
view, the TCA created a partnership between the states and the FCC
that allowed the FCC to establish nationwide pricing rules to be fol-
lowed by states in setting intrastate rates. 408 The RBOCs and state
regulators, however, view the TCA as explicitly granting state commis-
sions the power to set rates. 409 The FCC's view ultimately fails because
under the holding of Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, Con-
gress must provide a clear and unambiguous grant of intrastate juris-
diction in order for the FCC to have the power to set purely intrastate
rates.41° Congress did not provide this unambiguous grant in the lan-
guage of the TCA, and therefore section 2(b) of the 1934 Act prevents
the FCC from exercising intrastate jurisdiction:11 '
Both sides also have differing views with regard to the validity of
the pricing regulations themselves:912 The RBOCs argued that the regu-
lations for pricing of network elements, resale of retail products, trans-
port and termination of telecommunications traffic, interim proxy
rates and the pick-and-choose rule were invalid because they contra-
upon 47 U.S.C. § 252(i), which states that a LEC "shall make available any interconnection,
service, or network element provided under an agreement approved under this section to which
it is a party to •any other requesting telecoinmunications carrier upon the same terms and
conditions as those provided in the agreement." 47 U.S.C.A. § 252(i) (West Supp, 1997) (emphasis
added). The FCC regulations interpret this as the same "rates, terms and conditions," 47 C.F.R.
§ 51.809(a) (emphasis added).
404 See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(110 Stat.) 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
405 See id.
A08 See id.
4" See supra notes 155-270 and accompanying text,
408 See supra notes 213-70 and accompanying text.
404 See supra notes 155-212 and accompanying text,
410 See supra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
411 See supra notes 300-22 and accompanying text.
412 See supra notes 176-212, 239-70 and accompanying text.
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dieted the language and intent of the TCA. 4 " The FCC argued that
these regulations were consistent with the TCA's language and intent
and were a reasonable interpretation of the statute.'"
The Eighth Circuit should have ruled on the merits of the pricing
regulations and should have found that the regulations for pricing of
network elements are invalid because the TELRIC pricing methodol-
ogy provides no opportunity for an LEC ever to conform to the as-
sumptions upon which the methodology is based. 415 The court should
have concluded that the proxy rates are invalid because they were
calculated in an arbitrary fashion and serve to undermine the system
of private negotiations, the method preferred by the drafters of the
TCA.415 The court was correct in ruling that the pick-and-choose rule
is invalid because it, too, undermines the TCA's system of private
negotiations.97
On the other hand, the court should have upheld the regulations
regarding resale of retail product offerings and transport and termi-
nation ("T&T") of telecommunications traffic as valid interpretations
of the TCA.418 It should have ruled that the resale regulations are valid
because unlike TELRIC, they provide incumbent LECs an opportunity
to meet the assumptions upon which the regulations are based, be-
cause the assumptions are realistic and permit the incumbent LEC to
choose whether to meet them.4 '9 The court should have concluded that
the T&T regulations are valid because they provide an LEC the oppor-
tunity to rebut a reasonable presumption that an equal amount of
traffic approximates an equal amount of cost. 4" The Eighth Circuit
therefore was correct in holding that the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction
in promulgating its intrastate pricing regulations, but the court should
have ruled on the merits of the regulations.42 ' In doing so, the court
would have advanced Congress's intention of opening local telephone
markets to competition while respecting the economic rights of the
existing monopolistic local exchange carriers. 422
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